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DIVERSIFICATION OF THE JAPANESE JUDICIARY 
 
Daniel H. Foote† 
 
Abstract:  Japan has a career judiciary.  The Courts Act of 1947 provides that 
judges may be appointed from among prosecutors, attorneys, and law professors.  In 
practice, however, the vast majority of judges come from a fourth category, “assistant 
judges,” who are appointed directly upon completion of the legal training program and 
typically serve through retirement.  This continues a career tradition that dates back to the 
late nineteenth century.  For nearly that long, the Japanese bar has been advocating that the 
career system should be abolished and that a substantial portion of the judiciary, if not all 
judges, should be drawn from among experienced attorneys.  
 
The Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”), which met from 1999 through 2001, 
strongly endorsed the importance of diversification of the judiciary, and set forth a 
two-pronged proposal for achieving that goal: 1) establishing a system through which 
assistant judges would “leave their status as judges” and “gather diversified experience” 
outside the judiciary and 2) promoting increased hiring of experienced attorneys and others 
to the bench.  Utilizing the framework for analyzing court reform set forth by Malcolm 
Feeley in his classic work, Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail, this Article 
examines the various efforts at diversification of the Japanese judiciary, with a special focus 
on the most recent set of reforms.  
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Among the recent reforms to the Japanese judicial system, the lay 
participation (裁 判 員, saiban’in) system for criminal cases has received the 
lion’s share of attention.1  Yet that is by no means the only noteworthy recent 
reform.  The final report of the Justice System Reform Council (“Reform 
Council” or “JSRC”), issued in 2001,2 contained recommendations for a wide 
range of other changes to the judicial system, many of which resulted in 
concrete reforms.3  There were two sets of proposals related to the judicial 
appointment process: recommendations aimed at “diversifying” the judiciary4 
and at “reflecting the views of the public in appointment of judges.”5  This 
Article focuses primarily on the former set of reforms.  As we will see, 
however, the latter set of reforms also comes into play.6  
 
This Article uses Malcom Feeley’s framework for analyzing court 
reform, set out in his classic work Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple 
Solutions Fail,7 to evaluate the Japanese reform attempt.  To summarize that 
framework briefly, Feeley identifies the following five stages in the process of 
judicial reform: 1) diagnosis or conception; 2) initiation; 3) implementation; 
4) routinization; and 5) evaluation.  As its name implies, the diagnosis or 
conception stage involves “the process of identifying problems and 
                         
1 The works in English on the lay participation system include at least four books (ANNA 
DOBROVALSKAIA, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JURY SERVICE IN JAPAN (2016); DIMITRI VANOVERBEKE, JURIES IN 
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY 
(2015); ANDREW WATSON, POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN JAPANESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FROM JURORS TO LAY 
JUDGES (2016); MATTHEW J. WILSON, HIROSHI FUKURAI & TAKASHI MARUTA, JAPAN AND CIVIL JURY 
TRIALS: THE CONVERGENCE OF FORCES (2015)), along with many articles. The list of works in Japanese 
would run several pages.  
2  SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI (司法制度改革審議会) [JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL], 
SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI IKENSHO – 21 SEIKI NO NIHON O SASAERU SHIHŌ SEIDO (司法制度改革審
議会意見書 — 21世紀の日本を支える司法制度) [RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM 
COUNCIL – FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY] (June 12, 2001) 
[hereinafter JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS] http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/report-dex.html (Japanese); 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html (English).  
3  For an overview of the JSRC and its impact, see Daniel H. Foote, Introduction and Overview: 
Japanese Law at a Turning Point, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT xix, xx-xxxv (Daniel H. Foote ed., 
2007) (hereinafter A TURNING POINT). 
4  JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1. 
5  Id. at Ch. III, pt. 5, § 2. 
6  For an examination of the reforms aimed at reflecting public views and securing transparency in the 
judiciary’s personnel process, see Daniel H. Foote, The Supreme Court and the Push for Transparency in 
Lower Court Appointments in Japan, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1745, 1745–63 (2011) [hereinafter Foote, 
Transparency]. For a discussion of both sets of reforms at an earlier stage, see Daniel H. Foote, Recent 
Reforms to the Japanese Judiciary: Real Change or Mere Appearance?, 66 HŌSHAKAIGAKU (法社会学) 
128–61 (2007) [hereinafter Foote, Recent Reforms]. 
7  MALCOLM A. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 35–37 (1983). 
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considering solutions.”8  During the initiation stage, “new functions are added 
or practices are significantly altered.  This stage requires several decisions, 
[including]: Which of several alternatives will be adopted?” 9   The 
implementation stage “involves staffing, clarifying goals, and adapting to a 
new environment.  Ultimately, it is the task of translating abstract goals into 
practical policies.”10  As to the routinization stage, Feeley explains, “Unless a 
program is intended to be temporary or a single-shot effort, sooner or later it 
must be routinized . . . . Ultimately, the success of an innovation must be 
judged by how it performs under this routine rather than under its initial 
conditions.”11  Finally, with respect to evaluation, Feeley observes that “new 
programs are usually assessed during their experimental (the first three) stages 
rather than their routine periods (the fourth stage).”  He adds: “While such 
evaluations can tell us something about whether an idea can or cannot work, it 
tells us next to nothing about whether it will work.  Little is known about the 
eventual, routine performance of new programs . . . .”12 
 
After setting forth these five stages in the Introduction to his book, 
Feeley identifies several characteristics of institutions in which “change is 
most likely to succeed.”  These characteristics include: the existence of highly 
trained professionals with diffused and flexible authority, broad and adaptable 
duties, and flexible roles and mobility. 13   Then, following a detailed 
examination of several concrete court reform efforts in the United States, 
Feeley sets forth an even longer list of “impediments to change.”14  I will 
discuss Feeley’s impediments to change more extensively in Part VI.B. below 
during my assessment of the extent to which those factors apply in the context 
of the recent Japanese efforts at diversification of the judiciary.  To provide a 
brief summary here, the impediments identified by Feeley in the United States 
context include: a lack of a sense of historical perspective in the diagnosis or 
conception stage; 15  the role of outsiders in the reform efforts, especially 
relevant at the initiation stage;16 the problems of fragmentation, newness, and 
premature judgment at the implementation stage;17 factors such as loss of 
momentum, co-optation and adaptation leading to backsliding at the 
                         
8  Id. 
9  Id. at 36. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. at 37. 
12  Id. (emphasis in original). 
13  Id. at 38. 
14  Id. at 191. 
15  Id. at 192–93. 
16  Id. at 196–97. 
17  Id. at 197–200. 
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routinization stage;18 and problems such as lack of incentive for rigorous 
assessment, manipulation, and distortion at the evaluation stage.19  
 
With this overview of Feeley’s framework, let us turn to the main focus 
of this essay: efforts at diversification of the Japanese judiciary.  In the 
Japanese context, the concept of “diversity” in judiciary refers not to race, 
gender, or ideology, but to diversity in background and experiences.  As a 
reflection of this mindset, the Reform Council stressed the importance of 
securing judges “with abundant, diversified knowledge and experience.”20  
These recommendations, in turn, relate to the traditional structure of the 
Japanese judiciary, in which most judges spend their entire careers within the 
judiciary.  
 
The theme of diversification of the judiciary, as thus defined, is by no 
means new to Japan.  To the contrary, utilizing the Feeley framework, one can 
point to at least six distinct periods of diagnosis or conception, dating back 
over a century.  These include at least two earlier instances of initiation and 
implementation of efforts to promote diversification.  As we will see, those 
prior efforts did not result in major changes to the dominant career pattern.  
Some fifteen years have now passed since the latest set of reforms entered the 
implementation stage.  Thus, the system is well into what Feeley characterized 
as the routinization phase, and is ripe for evaluation. 
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE PREWAR PERIOD 
 
Prior to the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the system of courts in Japan was 
highly decentralized. 21   Soon after the Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”) was 
established in 1871, it set up a centralized nationwide court system.22  Initially, 
                         
18  Id. at 200–02. 
19  Id. at 202–05. 
20  JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1. 
21  As outlined in HIRAMATSU YOSHIRŌ (平松義郎), KINSEI KEIJI SOSHŌHŌ NO KENKYŪ (近世刑事訴
訟法の研究) [RESEARCH INTO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW IN THE MODERN ERA] (1960), as translated and 
summarized in Yoshirō Hiramatsu, Summary of Tokugawa Criminal Justice, 22 L. IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 105 
(Daniel H. Foote ed., trans., 1989). The Tokugawa shogunate and each of the feudal domains had their own 
court systems based on territorial principles; there were separate court systems for shrines, temples, and 
certain other organized bodies. 
22  With respect to the prewar system, see, e.g., Takaaki Hattori, The Legal Profession in Japan: Its 
Historical Development and Present State, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 110, 
110–17, 119–24 (Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1963) [hereinafter LEGAL ORDER]; John O. Haley, The Japanese 
Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in A TURNING POINT, supra note 3, at 99, 
115–17; ROKUMOTO KAHEI (六本佳平), NIHON NO HŌ TO SHAKAI（日本の法と社会）[JAPANESE LAW AND 
SOCIETY] 175–79 (2004); KANEKO HAJIME ＆ TAKESHITA MORIO （金子一＆竹下守夫）, SAIBANHŌ （裁
December 2017                 Diversification of the Japanese Judiciary                11 
 
 
there were no specified minimum qualifications, and most judges were 
appointed from among administrative officials.23  From 1884, however, newly 
appointed judges were required to meet one of three criteria: possession of a 
law degree, qualification as a daigennin (代言人, legal advocate; predecessor 
to the bengoshi （弁護士, attorney), or passage of a special examination for 
appointment of judges.24  
 
In 1890, the first comprehensive court law was enacted.25  Article 58 of 
that law, the Court Organization Act, provided that candidates for the judiciary 
and procuracy must pass the examination mentioned above, then complete 
three years of training (later reduced to one and a half years) in either courts or 
prosecutors’ offices. 26   Candidates then were required to pass a second 
examination prior to appointment. 27   Those who had served as imperial 
university professors or as bengoshi for at least three years were eligible for 
appointment without taking the exam or the training.28  
 
Despite the exceptions authorizing appointment of professors and 
attorneys, the judiciary soon evolved into a career system.  As of 1892, former 
officials from the MOJ and other administrative agencies still accounted for 
nearly half the judges, but over forty percent had already entered through the 
examination route.  Notably, only one of the 1255 judges had been appointed 
from among the ranks of legal advocates.29  By 1900, “nearly all” of Japan’s 
judges “had been selected through the process” set out in the Court 
Organization Act.30  According to that Act, judges served for life,31 although a 
later amendment established a mandatory retirement age, normally 
sixty-three.32  Throughout the prewar period, judges and prosecutors were 
                                                                          
判法）[COURTS LAW] 49–59 (4th ed. 2002).  
23  Hattori, supra note 22, at 114. 
24  ROKUMOTO, supra note 22, at 176. 
25  Saibansho Kōsei Hō (裁判所構成法) [Court Organization Act], Act No. 6 of 1890. 
26  Id. art. 58 (reduced to one and a half years pursuant to amendment in Act No. 10 of 1908). 
27  Graduates of imperial universities were exempted from the first exam but not the second. Id. art. 
65(2). 
28  Id. art. 65(1). The Court Organization Act expressly used the term bengoshi, even though the 
Attorneys Act establishing that position and title was not enacted until three years later (Act No. 7 of 1893). 
The original bill for the Attorneys Act had been prepared in 1890. Its passage was delayed by opposition from 
daigennin; following revisions, it was enacted in 1893. Hattori, supra note 22, at 126.  
29  Id. at 121 n.36. Nearly ten percent held jurisprudence degrees from domestic or foreign universities.  
30  Haley, supra note 22, at 115. 
31  Saibansho Kōsei Hō [Court Organization Act], Act No. 6 of 1890, art. 67. 
32  Id. art. 74-2 (added by amendment, pursuant to Act No. 101 of 1921). The one exception to the 
retirement age of 63 was the president of the highest court, the Daishin’in, who served until 65. Judges 
retained their status for life. 
12 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 27 NO. 1 
 
 
frequently recruited to administrative positions in the MOJ.33   Moreover, 
within the career judiciary, judges faced transfers and promotions on a 
periodic basis, decisions over which the Minister of Justice had authority.34  
While considerable mobility between the judiciary and procuracy existed 
during the early years,35 after the passage of the Court Organization Act in 
1890 movement between the two branches was rare. 36   The two tracks 
diverged; the judiciary and the procuracy each became firmly established as 
“elite professional bureaucracies.”37  
 
Notably, these two tracks diverged even more greatly from a third track: 
that of attorneys.  By 1880, attorneys were required to pass a nationwide 
examination to register as daigennin.38  The passage of the Attorneys Act 
(Bengoshihō) in 1893 was part of an effort to increase professionalization and 
raise the status of the bar.  These efforts included the new title bengoshi, along 
with a new examination system.39  For the next thirty years, however, the 
examination for attorneys was conducted separately from that for prospective 
judges and prosecutors.40  Although the examinations were combined in 1923, 
the career tracks remained separate.  Until 1933, no additional training was 
required for those who became bengoshi.  Even after a training requirement 
was added, training for attorneys was separate from training for judges and 
prosecutors, under the auspices of each local bar association.41  Thus, by the 
early twentieth century the pattern of separation of the legal profession into 
three separate tracks (referred to in Japan as hōsō sansha （法曹三者, the 
“three branches of the legal profession”) had taken firm root.  
 
The insulation of the judicial and prosecutorial tracks from the attorney 
track did not go unnoticed.  As early as 1890, daigennin had begun urging the 
                         
33  Hattori, supra note 22, at 125. 
34  See, e.g., id. at 123 (pursuant to art. 73 of the Court Organization Act, judges could not be removed to 
a different office or court against their will. However, it appears to have been taken for granted that judges 
would accept changes in their postings without protest).  
35  Haley, supra note 22, at 115–16. 
36  Id.; Hattori, supra note 22, at 125.  
37  Haley, supra note 22, at 115. 
38  See, e.g., Hattori, supra note 22, at 118–19; DARRYL E. FLAHERTY, PUBLIC LAW, PRIVATE PRACTICE: 
POLITICS, PROFIT, AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY JAPAN 115–18, 207–09 (2013).  
39  Hattori, supra note 22, at 126–27.  
40  Id. at 127–28. 
41  Id. at 128 n.65, 137–38 n.110. In many regions, the training system remained largely undeveloped by 
the time World War II started. In another difference that has taken on considerable significance in recent 
debates over the legal training process, at that time the attorney trainees were not paid, unlike the judge and 
prosecutor trainees, who were regarded essentially as apprentice civil servants and received regular stipends. 
Id. at 138 n.111. 
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MOJ to appoint judges and prosecutors from among their ranks.42  Following 
passage of the Attorneys Act, bengoshi began to take up the call.  By the turn 
of the century, organizations of attorneys had begun to push for judges to be 
hired from among practicing lawyers, under the slogan hōsō ichigen (法曹一
元).43  That term literally means “unification of the legal profession.”  It has 
been used in various senses, including, at its broadest, simply a shared 
awareness of attorneys, judges and prosecutors as being members of the same 
profession.  More commonly, it is used to describe the view that judges should 
be selected from experienced members of the bar, as is the case in 
Anglo-American legal systems.44  That same slogan has continued to animate 
calls for reform to the judicial appointment process ever since.  Accordingly, 
one can point all the way back to the late 1800s as an initial instance of 
diagnosis or conception of the issue.  Even though the slogan has remained 
identical, motivations have shifted.  At that time and for many years thereafter, 
the major objective was raising the status of attorneys, rather than diversifying 
the judiciary.45  Whatever the motivations may have been, the calls went 
unheeded.  The tradition of a career judiciary became ever more deeply rooted 
through the prewar period. 
 
Shortly before World War II, the Japanese bar undertook a concerted 
effort to promote appointment of judges from among experienced attorneys.  
In 1937, the Japan Association of Attorneys established a Committee to 
Effectuate the Hōsō Ichigen System.46  That committee prepared a resolution, 
undertook outreach to the MOJ and other relevant parties, and drafted a bill.  
The bill was introduced before the Imperial Diet in 1938, and would have 
amended the Court Organization Act to require that all judges and prosecutors 
                         
42  FLAHERTY, supra note 38, at 264.  
43 Id.; Higuchi Shunji (樋口俊二), Senjin ni Manabu Hōsō Ichigen no Gendaiteki Kadai (先人に学ぶ
法曹一元の現代的課題) [Learning from Our Predecessors about Contemporary Challenges for Hōsō 
Ichigen], 39 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 2, at 32 (1988). 
44  See, e.g., Hattori, supra note 22, at 139–40 n.116. 
45  See, e.g., id. at 139–40. Along similar lines, legal advocates and attorneys in the 1890s also objected 
to rules allowing former judges and prosecutors to receive licenses to practice law without undertaking any 
examinations out of concern that the less competent judges and prosecutors would resign (or, presumably, be 
nudged out of their positions in the downsizing that resulted from fiscal austerity measures) and then register 
as attorneys, thereby lowering the level of the bar. FLAHERTY, supra note 38, at 263; see also ŌUCHI HYŌE & 
WAGATSUMA SAKAE （大内兵衛＆我妻栄), NIHON NO SAIBAN SEIDO（日本の裁判制度）[THE JAPANESE 
COURT SYSTEM]  26–27 (1965) (primary motivation for hōsō ichigen movement in the early 1920s was 
“leveling” the legal profession by eliminating the gap between judges and prosecutors, on the one hand, and 
attorneys on the other). 
46  Kishii Tatsuo (岸井辰雄), Nihon Bengoshishi: Bengoshihō Sekō Ikō (日本弁護士史：弁護士法施
行已降) [History of Japanese Attorneys: Since the Attorneys Act Took Effect], in BENGOSHISHI (弁護士史) 
[HISTORY OF ATTORNEYS] 39 (Tokyo Bengoshikai [Tokyo Bar Association] et al. ed., 1939).  
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be appointed from among those with at least ten years of experience as 
attorneys.47  The bill passed the House of Representatives.  Yet when the Diet 
session came to a close it was still pending in the House of Peers48 (where 
prospects for passage were low49), and it never became law.50  
 
Notably, the rationale offered by the Japanese bar at that time focused 
explicitly on diversifying the judiciary.  The resolution highlighted the 
complexity of matters coming before the courts and the need not only for legal 
knowledge, but for a deep understanding of society and human nature.  To 
expect such understanding from those who had entered the judiciary directly 
upon completing legal education, without spending even a day as members of 
society and with no other experience, is “akin to climbing a tree in search of 
fish.”51  Thus, in the late 1930s, one finds a striking example of diagnosis or 
conception of the concern over diversification, with a concrete reform 
proposal that took a major step toward the initiation stage before stalling. 
 
III. POSTWAR REFORMS 
 
The next major developments occurred during the postwar reform 
process.  The most important development to uniting the legal profession was 
a fundamental change in the training system.  As mentioned earlier, under the 
prewar system there was a “rigid separation” between training for judges and 
prosecutors, on the one hand, and attorneys, on the other.52  Following the 
postwar reforms, judges, prosecutors, and attorneys took the same bar 
examination.  Those who passed undertook two additional years of training 
together, through the Legal Training and Research Institute (LTRI) under the 
auspices of the Supreme Court.53  This reform had profound implications for 
                         
47  Id. at 39–44. 
48  KANEKO &TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 231. 
49  See ŌUCHI & WAGATSUMA, supra note 45, at 28–29.  
50  The bill reportedly was reintroduced in each of the two subsequent sessions of the Diet, but suffered 
the same fate each time, evidently meeting strong opposition by the MOJ. It has been reported, however, that 
the Ministry appointed over 70 attorneys to posts in the judiciary and procuracy between 1938 and 1940, 
perhaps in order to placate the bar association. Higuchi Shunji, supra note 43, at 32–33.  
51  Resolution reproduced in Kishii, supra note 46, at 39–41. 
52  Hakaru Abe, Education of the Legal Profession in Japan, in LEGAL ORDER, supra note 22, at 153–54. 
53  E.g., Hattori, supra note 22, at 137–38. It was only near the end of that two-year period that 
determinations were made as to which candidates would proceed on the judge track, prosecutor track, and 
attorney track. For a detailed discussion of the postwar reforms to the legal training system by the 
then-president of the LTRI, see Abe, supra note 52. In 1999, the training period was reduced to eighteen 
months, and thereafter to just over one year; but, despite occasional suggestions that the program should be 
limited to prospective judges, prosecutors, and courtroom litigators, the Japanese bar remains deeply 
committed to unified training for all entrants to the legal profession. For detailed examinations of the Japanese 
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the sense of identity among members of the three branches of the profession, 
as well as those with attorney status.54  
 
The postwar reforms also provided the bar with another opportunity to 
push for hōsō ichigen in its more particularized sense.  Most of the postwar 
reforms to the Japanese legal and judicial systems took place under the 
auspices of the Allied Occupation of Japan, which lasted from the end of the 
war in 1945 through early 1952, led by General Douglas MacArthur, 
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (“SCAP”). 55   Japanese 
authorities embarked on some legal reforms even before the Occupation did 
so.  In meetings of the Justice System Revision Council, established under the 
MOJ in late 1945, attorneys urged that all judges and prosecutors be drawn 
from experienced lawyers.56  They renewed the call in two other reform 
councils the following year. 57   Although the Revision Council ended up 
rejecting the proposal, it endorsed a statement expressing the desire that 
preparations be made so hōsō ichigen could be achieved in the near future.58  
 
At least one member of the Occupation publicly voiced his support for 
hōsō ichigen.59  His views did not reflect the overall stance of the Occupation, 
however.60  The Occupation was concerned (as were many Japanese judges 
                                                                          
legal training system, including consideration of later reforms, see Rokumoto, Legal Education, in A 
TURNING POINT, supra note 3, at 190, 213–14; Daniel H. Foote, The Trials and Tribulations of Japan’s Legal 
Education Reforms, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 369 (2013). 
54  For a discussion of the impact on “the ideal of unification,” see Abe, supra note 52, at 167–70.  
55   For overviews of the reforms to the legal and judicial systems under the Occupation, see, e.g., Alfred 
C. Oppler, The Reform of Japan’s Legal and Judicial System under Allied Occupation, 24 WASH. L. REV. 290 
(1949); ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK (1976). 
56  USHIOMI TOSHITAKA (潮見俊隆), SHIHŌ NO HŌSHAKAIGAKU (司法の法社会学) [SOCIOLOGY OF 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE] 176–78, 199–201 (1982). The Council was the Shihō Seido Kaisei 
Shingikai (司法制度改正審議会). For an overview of the Council’s establishment and activities, together 
with minutes of its deliberations, see 2 NAITŌ YORIHIRO (内藤頼博), SHŪSENGO NO SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU 
NO KEIKA (ICHI JIMUTŌKYOKUSHA NO TACHIBA KARA) (終戦後の司法制度改革の経過 (一事務当局者の
立場から)) [THE COURSE OF POSTWAR REFORM TO THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A 
SINGLE MEMBER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES)] 2–46 (1959).  The original, appearing in two 
volumes, was reprinted as NIHON RIPPŌ SHIRYŌ ZENSHŪ (日本立法資料全集), BEKKAN（別巻）91 & 92 
[COMPLETE COLLECTION OF MATERIALS ON JAPANESE LEGISLATION, SEPARATE VOLUMES 91 & 92] (1997). 
57  See 2 NAITŌ YORIHIRO, supra note 56, at 71–72; USHIOMI, supra note 56, at 201.  
58  2 NAITŌ YORIHIRO, supra note 56, at 46 (minutes of meeting held on December 18, 1945). 
59  In March 1946, Captain Anthony Maniscalco, a member of the Public Safety Division of the Civil 
Intelligence Section, sent the MOJ a “private draft” in his “personal capacity as one who might be involved in 
the justice system reform process,” expressing support for a system in which judges and prosecutors would be 
selected from law professors or attorneys with at least three years of experience. Japanese language summary 
contained in id. at 54–55. 
60  In February 1946, Alfred Oppler joined General MacArthur’s General Headquarters and became the 
head of the unit (renamed the Courts and Law Division later that year) in charge of reforms to the judiciary.  
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themselves) that the judiciary had been under the control of the MOJ and 
insisted on establishing an independent judiciary.61  Moreover, the Occupation 
sought to position the newly established Supreme Court (which replaced the 
Daishin’in as the highest court) outside the traditional career system.  They 
envisioned that the fifteen justices on the Supreme Court would come from a 
broad range of backgrounds.62  For courts below the Supreme Court level, 
though, the Occupation did not insist on a shift to the hōsō ichigen model.  
Under the Constitution63 and the Courts Act of 194764 (which replaced the 
prior Court Organization Act), the judges of the lower courts are appointed by 
the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court.  The 
Occupation also sought to provide means for dealing with “incompetent or 
otherwise objectionable judges.”65  They aimed to replace life tenure with a 
system in which judges must be reappointed every ten years (again from a list 
of persons nominated by the Supreme Court),66 until they reached a mandatory 
retirement age (sixty-five for lower court judges).67  Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court was given express authority to assign positions for lower court judges.68  
This effectively confirmed the practice of rotating judges to new positions on a 
regular basis.  Finally, rather than providing for immediate appointment of 
candidates as full judges following successful completion of the LTRI training 
program, Article 42 of the Courts Act required at least ten years of experience 
in one or more of several specified categories.  In connection with the debate 
over diversification of the judiciary, it is important to note that, from the time 
that Act was enacted in 1947, those categories have included prosecutor, 
                                                                          
Oppler himself had been an administrative law judge in Germany, which had a career judiciary; his chief 
assistant, Thomas Blakemore, had studied law in Japan prior to the war and was familiar with the judicial 
system. As a whole, they and the other Occupation authorities were comfortable with the career system. See, 
e.g., Oppler, supra note 55, at 86–87, 91–93, 98–99, 305–13.  
61  See, e.g., GOVERNMENT SECTION: SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, POLITICAL 
REORIENTATION OF JAPAN, SEPTEMBER 1945 TO SEPTEMBER 1948, at 200 (1948) [hereinafter SCAP]. 
62  See, e.g., Oppler, supra note 55, at 311. One goal for broadening this composition of the Supreme 
Court was to raise the Court’s prestige. Even more importantly, the change reflected the intent that the 
Supreme Court should serve a check on the other branches of government, and in doing so should approach 
matters from a broader standpoint than had been the case previously. As envisioned, Supreme Court justices 
ever since have come from various backgrounds (albeit with highly standardized appointment patterns), 
always including at least one or two from outside the traditional legal profession. See Haley, supra note 22, at 
105–12. 
63  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] (憲法) [CONSTITUTION], art. 80 (Japan). 
64  Saibanshohō (裁判所法) [Courts Act], Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 40. 
65  SCAP, supra note 61, at 201. 
66  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] (憲法) [CONSTITUTION], art. 80 (Japan). 
67  Saibanshohō (裁判所法) [Courts Act], Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 50. For Supreme Court justices and 
Summary Court judges, the retirement age is 70. Id. 
68  Id. art. 57. 
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attorney, and professor of law, as well as assistant judge.69  In turn, Article 43 
provides that assistant judges are to be appointed from those who have 
completed apprenticeship training.70 
 
To be sure, the Court Organization Act of 1890 also authorized 
appointment of attorneys and law professors to the judiciary, but that authority 
was rarely used.  In sharp contrast, during the early postwar years, a substantial 
number of attorneys were appointed as judges.  That does not include the 
lower-ranked Summary Court judges, many of whom came from the bar 
during that period.71  In 1947 and 1948, before the first class completed the 
newly established LTRI training program, the only newly hired judges came 
from among attorneys.  In 1949, seventy-two members from the first LTRI 
class were hired as assistant judges.  There were sixty more attorney 
appointees that year.  Attorneys continued to account for between 15% and 
35% of judge appointees each year through 1954, and, with the exception of 
two years in the mid-1950s, for over 10% through 1960.  All told, during the 
fourteen years from 1947 through 1960, attorneys constituted nearly 25% of 
the lower court judges hired.  Thus, one can point to the early postwar years 
not only as an instance of diagnosis or conception, but as an instance of 
initiation and even implementation of steps toward diversification.  
 
That said, the change did not last.  The level of attorney appointments 
gradually declined through the 1950s and dropped off dramatically after 1962.  
Thus, the incipient trend toward diversification of the judiciary withered by 
the early 1960s.  Japan’s career judiciary became firmly re-entrenched.  The 
overwhelming majority of judges entered as assistant judges immediately after 
completing LTRI training and proceeded through reappointments every ten 
years (and regular transfers to new positions, typically every three years) up 
until retirement.72  
                         
69  Id. art. 42(1). 
70  Id. art. 43. 
71  With the exception of data for the even-numbered years between 1948 and 1954, the figures 
contained in this and the following paragraph are calculated from a table in KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 
22, at 234. The data for the missing years is contained in the same table in the prior edition of that book, 
KANEKO HAJIME & TAKESHITA MORIO, （金子一＆竹下守夫）, SAIBANHŌ （裁判法) [COURTS LAW] (3rd ed. 
1994). 
72  As noted above, the mandatory retirement age for lower court judges is sixty-five. Although the 
exact numbers are not publicized, a fair number of judges retire early, most of whom become attorneys. See, 
e.g., Igaki Yasuhiro (井垣康弘), Watakushi no Kōsō Suru “Hōsō Ichigen Seido” (私の構想する「法曹一元」
制度) [The “Hōsō Ichigen” System as I Conceive It], 51 JIYŪ TO SEIGI no. 1, at 76 (2000) (of approximately 
sixty assistant judges who entered the judiciary together in 1967, only about half were still on the bench in 
2000; of the remainder, the great majority became attorneys or notaries); Watanabe Chihara (渡辺千原), 




IV. THE PROVISIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEM INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE: THE 
ROAD TO AND THE AFTERMATH 
 
Proponents of hōsō ichigen did not give up.  The next major proposal 
emanated from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (“JFBA”), the 
governing body for the nationwide bar. In March 1954, the JFBA executive 
board approved an “Outline for Hōsō Ichigen.”73  A few years later, JFBA 
received an important ally, the Japan Bar Association (“JBA,” Nihon 
Hōritsuka Kyōkai, 日本法律家協会), a prestigious voluntary organization 
that includes judges, prosecutors, and legal academics, as well as practicing 
lawyers.  In June 1961, the JBA board of governors approved its own 
“Concrete Outline for Realization of Hōsō Ichigen.”74  
 
The two proposals shared the view that the assistant judge system 
should be discontinued and judges should be drawn from persons with 
experience outside the judiciary.  However, they differed considerably on the 
specifics.  Under the JFBA outline, all judges and prosecutors would be 
appointed from among experienced attorneys.  JFBA, as the governing body 
for the bar, would have authority to prepare the list of candidates for the 
judiciary.75  In addition to highlighting the value of the real-world experience 
from attorneys, the JFBA proposal stressed the goal of democratizing the 
judiciary and procuracy.  By replacing career judges and prosecutors with 
attorneys, the reform would break the cycle of dominance by bureaucratic 
elites.76  In contrast, under the JBA outline, judges would be drawn from those 
with rich experience as attorneys, prosecutors, or in other types of related legal 
work.77  Thus, the JBA viewed the shift away from the traditional career 
system primarily in terms of diversifying the judiciary.78  
                                                                          
Bengoshi e no Tenshoku: Zenshoku Keiken no aru Bengoshi no Gyōmu Tokusei to Bengoshikan (弁護士への
転職：前職経験のある弁護士の業務特性と弁護士観) [Occupation Change to Lawyer: Special Work 
Characteristics and Views on Lawyers by Lawyers with Prior Employment Experience], in HENDŌKI NO 
NIHON NO BENGOSHI (変動期の日本の弁護士) [JAPANESE LAWYERS IN A TIME OF CHANGE] 160, 172–75 
(Satō Iwao (佐藤岩夫) & Hamano Ryō (濱野亮) eds., 2015). 
73  KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 231. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. Furthermore, since all members of the legal profession would begin their legal careers as 
practicing lawyers, the JFBA would also take charge of the LTRI training program. Id. 
76  ŌUCHI & WAGATSUMA, supra note 45, at 32–33. 
77  Id. at 32–33; KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 231. The JBA envisioned that in the future 
those who passed the bar exam and completed LTRI training increasingly would enter legal work in 
government agencies or other bodies, ŌUCHI & WAGATSUMA, supra note 45, at 33. 
78  The JBA also envisioned the establishment of a new body to screen candidates for the judiciary and 
supervise legal training. In its conception, that body, as with the JBA itself, would include representatives 




Despite their differences, the two outlines agreed on the importance of 
diversifying the judiciary.  So when the Diet passed a bill in May 1962 
establishing the Provisional Justice System Investigation Committee 
(“Investigation Committee” or “Committee”), proponents of hōsō ichigen 
might well have thought their long cherished goal was nearing realization.79  
The Committee operated under the Cabinet.  It consisted of twenty members, 
including three judges, three prosecutors, and three attorneys, and was chaired 
by University of Tokyo Professor Emeritus Wagatsuma Sakae.80  A major 
impetus for the Committee was the difficulty of attracting sufficient new 
judges.  As a result, existing judges were overburdened, leading to delays in 
processing cases. 81   The enabling legislation called on the Committee to 
investigate “fundamental and comprehensive measures urgently needed . . . so 
as to ensure proper operation of the justice system,” with a particular focus on 
the following two items: 1) “matters related to the hōsō ichigen system” 
(which the legislation further defined as “the system under which, in principle, 
judges are appointed from among those who possess qualification as lawyers 
and have engaged in legally related work other than as judges”), and 2) “other 
items related to the appointment system and salary system for judges and 
prosecutors.” 82   Although the Investigation Committee completed its 
deliberations over fifty years ago, the experiences of that period hold deep 
relevance for recent debates and developments.  Accordingly, it is helpful to 
review the Committee’s deliberations and recommendations together with the 
response to those recommendations. 
 
The Committee devoted a considerable portion of its deliberations, and 
nearly fifty pages of its final report, to the hōsō ichigen issue.  The report 
discussed the importance of diversifying the judiciary, and criticized the 
bureaucratic nature and other weaknesses of the traditional career system.83  
Yet the tone of the deliberations and the final conclusions were far from the 
hopes and expectations of hōsō ichigen proponents.  Based in part on prior 
                                                                          
from all three branches of the legal profession. KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 231. 
79  Rinji Shihō Seido Chōsakai Setchihō (臨時司法制度調査会設置法) [Provisional Justice System 
Investigation Committee Establishment Act], Act No. 122 of 1962 [hereinafter Establishment Act]. 
80  The other members were seven Diet members, two businesspeople, and one additional legal scholar. 
81  Rinji Shihō Seido Chōsakai Ikensho （臨時司法制度調査会意見書） [Report of the Provisional 
Justice System Investigation Committee], 16 HŌSŌ JIHŌ, no. 8, at 1 (1964) [hereinafter Investigation 
Committee Report] (reprinted as a special supplement). 
82  Establishment Act, art. 2.  
83  Investigation Committee Report, supra note 81, at 19–21, 32–37. 
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experience and survey results,84 the Committee raised numerous doubts about 
the feasibility of attracting sufficient attorneys to enter the judiciary.  The 
Committee noted various practical barriers: burdens associated with the 
regular transfers (which are especially hard on those with families); 
responsibilities to existing clients; judges’ heavy workloads; loss of income 
due to the disparity in pay levels between attorneys and judges; loss in 
retirement allowances and pension benefits from switching employment; and 
the complexities of judicial duties.85 
 
The Committee also identified a long list of conditions that would need 
to be met in order to achieve successful implementation of hōsō ichigen.86  
The first essential precondition, in the view of the Committee, was a “dramatic 
increase” in the size of the legal profession.87  Other requirements for success 
included alleviating the great disparity in the level of attorneys in urban and 
rural regions, raising public trust in attorneys, and strengthening attorneys’ 
sense of public service, as well as improving working conditions, pay and 
other benefits for judges. 88   Quite apart from the practical barriers and 
preconditions, several Committee members expressed doubts about attorneys’ 
qualifications, and they raised concerns about dangers associated with 
appointing lawyers to the bench, including “the tendency to overly 
individualistic attitudes” among attorneys.89  They also expressed praise for 
the merits of the existing career system, including its strengths in ensuring 
fairness, integrity, and legal stability.90 
 
As its conclusion, the Investigation Committee stated: 
 
                         
84  Notwithstanding the number of attorneys who entered the judiciary in the early postwar years, see 
supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text, by 1964, former attorneys constituted only 14% of the judiciary. In 
a survey conducted by the Supreme Court in 1961, only four out of 142 attorneys with 10–12 years of 
experience surveyed expressed an interest in joining the judiciary. Investigation Committee Report, supra note 
81at 52–53.  
85  Id. at 53. 
86  Id. at 38–41.  
87  Id. at 38. The report used the phrase hiyakuteki zōka (飛躍的増加).  
88  Id. at 38–41. 
89  Id. at 36. 
90  See, e.g., id. at 33–38. Moreover, it bears note that the concerns and criticisms listed in the official 
report evidently were toned down considerably. Ōno Masao, Hōsō Ichigen no Rinen to Bengoshi no Sekinin 
(法曹一元の理念と弁護士の責任) [The Principle of Hōsō Ichigen and the Responsibility of Attorneys], 15 
JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 12, at 6 (1964). 
December 2017                 Diversification of the Japanese Judiciary                21 
 
 
The hōsō ichigen system (as defined in the [Establishment Act]), 
if it is achieved smoothly, would be one91 desirable system for 
Japan. 
 
However, the various conditions that would serve as the base for 
achieving this system are not yet in place. 
 
Accordingly, at the present time, improvements in the existing 
system should be undertaken while bearing in mind the strengths 
of the hōsō ichigen system, and at the same time sufficient 
consideration should be given to preparing the base referred to 
above.92 
 
The first concrete recommendation for action called on the three 
branches of the profession “to cooperate so that as many suitable attorneys, 
prosecutors, etc., as possible may be appointed as judges.” 93   Yet as 
Wagatsuma, who chaired the Committee, noted the following year, the bar and 
many other observers regarded the final report as representing the “funeral” 
for hōsō ichigen.94  Members of the bar, he added, were angry to see this 
funeral, whereas many judges and prosecutors were “relieved.”95 
 
As to his own vision, Wagatsuma offered the following:  
 
Personally, I would like to see the number of candidates accepted 
to the LTRI roughly doubled, resulting in about 1000 new 
entrants to the legal profession each year.  If those new entrants 
could not all be absorbed as judges, prosecutors, and attorneys, 
they should enter posts handling legal matters as government 
officials or join legal departments in banks and companies.  And 
those who had attained experience in these varied occupations 
would then become judges.  I anticipated that this sort of 
approach to preparing the base would arise naturally from our 
deliberations.96  
                         
91  The word “one” (一つ) in the recommendation carries the distinct connotation that it is not the only 
desirable system. 
92  Investigation Committee Report, supra note 81, at 185 (emphasis added). 
93  Id. 
94  ŌUCHI & WAGATSUMA, supra note 45, at 178.  
95  Id. at 178–79, 181. 
96  Id. at 179–80. Wagatsuma stressed that he did not mean to imply that the assistant judge system 
would be abolished. Rather, he felt it would be desirable if the career system accounted for about half of all 




To place this comment in context, after ranging between 224 and 346 
during the period from 1949 through 1960, the number of bar exam passers 
rose to 496 in 1963, 508 in 1964, and 554 in 1966.  That proved to be the 
highest point for the next quarter century.  From 1967 through 1990, the 
number of passers hovered at about 500 per year, with a high of 537 and a low 
of just 446.  It was not until 1999, thirty-four years after Wagatsuma’s 
statement, that the number of passers reached 1000.97 Also, until 2000, the 
Attorneys Act prohibited attorneys from entering full-time employment in 
governmental entities. 98   Lastly, until 2003, the Attorneys Act required 
attorneys to obtain authorization from their local bar association before 
entering employment in banks or companies.99  As of the mid-1960s, it was 
virtually unheard of for lawyers to work in companies; and it is only over the 
past decade that the number of in-house lawyers has begun to rise 
substantially.100  In sum, Wagatsuma was well ahead of his time—or, to put it 
differently, Japan was very slow to recognize the wisdom of his vision. 
 
Wagatsuma was critical of the judges and prosecutors who were 
relieved to see the “funeral” for hōsō ichigen, stating, “the harms of the career 
system are far more serious than they realize.”101  He expressed much greater 
frustration, however, with the attitude of the bar.  In his words, “[w]hen 
matters relating to reform of the justice system come up, no matter how small 
the issue, members of the bar say that if hōsō ichigen is adopted, those 
problems will all be solved immediately, but if it isn’t adopted things won’t 
improve.”102  “They offer their assurances that, once they put their minds to it 
and undertake preparations, there will be enough attorneys who desire to enter 
the judiciary, but they don’t offer any particular concrete measures to be 
                                                                          
judges, with the remaining half coming from a broad range of backgrounds outside the judiciary. Id. at 181. 
97  See, e.g., Rokumoto, supra note 53, at 213–14. 
98  Bengoshihō (弁護士法) [Attorneys Act], Act No. 205 of 1949, art. 30, sec. 1 (prior to revision 
pursuant to Act No. 128 of 2003). The general prohibition was not abolished until 2003. In 2000, however, an 
exception was added for fixed-term positions in national government agencies. That exception was 
accompanied by the passage of a separate act authorizing such appointments. Ippanshoku no ninkitsuki 
shokuin no saiyō oyobi kyūyo no tokurei ni kansuru hōritsu (一般職の任期付職員の採用及び給与の特例
に関する法律) [Act regarding Special Exceptions for the Hiring and Salaries of Regular (Public) Employees 
on a Fixed Term Basis], Act No. 125 of 2000. 
99  Id. art. 30, sec. 3 (prior to revision pursuant to Act No. 128 of 2003). 
100  See, e.g., Nihon Soshikinai Bengoshi Kyōkai (日本組織内弁護士協会) [Japan In-House Lawyers 
Association], Kigyōnai Bengoshisū no Suii (企業内弁護士数の推移) [Trends in the Numbers of Lawyers 
Working in Corporations] (2017), http://jila.jp/pdf/transition.pdf. 
101  ŌUCHI & WAGATSUMA, supra note 45, at 180–81. 
102  Id. at 178. 
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taken.”103  In explaining why the Investigation Committee did not set out more 
clearly what sorts of changes to the existing system were needed, Wagatsuma 
said: “That’s because we could not reach consensus on those matters.  What 
astonished me most of all is that even on the topic of increasing the size of the 
legal profession, the attorneys on the Committee couldn’t agree among 
themselves.”104   
 
As it turned out, by raising pay levels and undertaking improvements to 
working conditions, 105 the judiciary regained the ability to recruit sufficient 
new assistant judges.  As alluded to earlier, the Committee also called for the 
establishment of a “Justice Council,” including representatives of each of the 
three branches of the profession and other persons of learning and experience, 
to consult on issues of importance, “such as cooperation on matters relating 
to . . . the size of the legal profession [and] interchanges within the 
profession.”106  JFBA refused to participate in the proposed Council, feeling 
that the Committee’s treatment of hōsō ichigen and other matters represented a 
betrayal.107  When coupled with the prevailing attitude, explicitly endorsed by 
a 1970 Diet resolution, that “matters related to justice system reform should be 
achieved based on consensus by the three branches of the legal profession,” 108 
this refusal to participate left many matters (including, notably, the 
Committee’s recommendation for a major increase in the size of the legal 
profession) effectively in limbo.  Moreover, whatever Wagatsuma may have 
felt personally, the Committee report seemed to signal the burying of hōsō 
ichigen for many years to come.  
 
In sum, the period leading up to the establishment of the Investigation 
Committee, together with the Committee deliberations, almost certainly 
represents the most extended and detailed diagnosis of the issue of 
diversification of the judiciary ever undertaken in Japan.  Yet rather than 
leading to initiation and implementation of reform measures, those 
deliberations and their aftermath further entrenched the career judiciary.  The 
number of attorneys appointed to the judiciary had already begun to decline by 
                         
103  Id. at 181. 
104  Id. at 179. 
105  Investigation Committee Report, supra note 81, at 191–94. 
106  Id. at 191. 
107  KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 232; KOBAYASHI MASAHIRO (小林正啓), KONNA 
NICHIBENREN NI DARE GA SHITA? (こんな日弁連に誰がした？) [WHO TURNED JFBA INTO THIS?] 160, 230 
(2010). 
108  Resolution of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the Upper House, quoted in KOBAYASHI, supra note 
107, at 118.  
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the early 1960s.  Thereafter, such appointments virtually dried up.  During the 
twenty-four-year period from 1964 through 1987, attorneys accounted for 
only forty-two of the 1681 judges and assistant judges appointed—under 2.5% 
of the total.109 
 
V. RECRUITMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR JUDICIAL POSITIONS IN THE LATE 
1980S AND 1990S 
 
Nearly a quarter of a century passed before the next major development, 
one that went beyond diagnosis to initiation and took concrete steps for 
implementation.  This time, the impetus came not from the bar but from the 
judiciary.  In March 1988, the Supreme Court issued a document entitled The 
Main Points for Hiring and Selection of Judges.  In it, the judiciary announced 
the plan to hire approximately twenty judges annually from among attorneys 
under the age of fifty-five with at least fifteen years of practice experience.  As 
the reason for this new policy, the Supreme Court highlighted the desire to hire 
judges with broad experience, able to handle complex and diverse cases 
arising from advances in society.110  
 
Chief Justice Yaguchi Kōichi (矢口洪一) was responsible for initiating 
this policy.111  Yaguchi was deeply familiar with the hōsō ichigen issue, having 
served on the support staff for the Investigation Committee. In a set of 
memoirs, published in 1993, 112   Yaguchi rejected the view, sometimes 
espoused by attorneys, that, “due to the career system, judges inevitably are 
ignorant of the ways of the world whereas attorneys are never lacking in that 
regard.”113  At the same time, he voiced support for diversifying the judiciary, 
stating, “From my many years of experience I feel there is no need to be 
wedded to the career system . . . . In today’s complicated society, I don’t think 
it’s necessarily desirable to insist on only one pure system.”114  He went on to 
say, “I believe it’s good for judges from various backgrounds to work together, 
improving their abilities . . . by sharing their experiences and viewpoints.”115  
 
                         
109  KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 232. 
110  Id. at 233 (summary of Hanji Saiyō Senkō Yōryō (判事採用選考要領) from the Japanese Supreme 
Court (1988)). 
111  See, e.g., YAGUCHI KŌICHI (矢口洪一), SAIKŌSAIBANSHO TO TOMO NI (最高裁判所とともに) 
[TOGETHER WITH THE SUPREME COURT] 43 (1993). 
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 44. 
114  Id. at 43. 
115  Id. at 44. 
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In a later chapter of his memoirs (focused primarily on a program, 
which Yaguchi also initiated, of sending young judges to the United States and 
Europe to study the jury system and other forms of lay participation), Yaguchi 
returned to the career system:  
 
Having been a witness to judicial administration in the postwar 
era, I recognize the many strengths of Japan’s career judicial 
system, but I’ve also felt a number of doubts.  Given that it’s a 
career system, regular training is essential for assistant 
judges . . . , but if the training from start to finish is confined to 
internal training within the judiciary, there’s a tendency to 
become detached from the feelings of the general public. That’s 
why I’ve placed efforts into training outside the judiciary and to 
overseas experience.  
 
How about boldly adopting hōsō ichigen? . . . Under current 
circumstances, even if we were to appoint judges from among 
attorneys, we would be limited to an extremely low number.  In 
that case, is there some system by which we could maintain the 
strengths of the career system while directly reflecting the views 
of the public in trials?  
 
[It was with that thought in mind] that we undertook investigation 
and research [into the jury and lay participation systems], to 
consider whether they would be appropriate for Japan.116  
 
As these quotes reflect, Yaguchi viewed both diversification of the judiciary 
and the lay participation system as means to expose career judges to external 
influences and thereby broaden their perspectives.  
 
Yaguchi’s reference to “plac[ing] efforts into training outside the 
judiciary and to overseas experience” bears especial note.  Reflecting back on 
his career, Yaguchi commented, “With the exception of a handful of judges 
who undertook study abroad, within the judiciary there was no thought at all of 
trying to learn anything from society, other than from the legal academy.”117  
As of the early 1970s, at most two or three judges each year went to the United 
States for study.  As soon as he became head of the Personnel Bureau in the 
Supreme Court General Secretariat in 1970, Yaguchi proposed that half of 
                         
116  Id. at 114. 
117  Id. at 88. 
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each class of judges should attain experience abroad.  He reports that the 
proposal initially was met with the traditional attitude that study abroad was a 
reward, akin to a “medal for meritorious service.”  He kept at it though, and in 
1972 the judiciary initiated a special program to send assistant judges abroad 
to study in the United States, England, Germany and France. 118   The 
University of Washington School of Law was one of the earliest schools to 
participate in that program, and has received an assistant judge from Japan as a 
visiting scholar every year since 1977.119  By the time Yaguchi penned his 
memoirs in 1993, he reported that the judiciary was sending between ten and 
twenty assistant judges abroad for study each year, and that overall, including 
short term fact-finding missions, well over fifty judges were going abroad 
every year.120 
 
In addition to the study abroad program, in the early 1980s, when he 
was Secretary General at the Supreme Court General Secretariat, Yaguchi took 
the lead in establishing a program to have about ten senior assistant judges, 
typically those in their tenth and final year as assistant judges, spend three to 
four weeks working in major newspapers. 121   As Yaguchi explained, the 
genesis for that idea was that “correctness” and “promptness” are both 
important values for judges.  However, those values sometimes are regarded as 
being in conflict.  He felt that, by experiencing work at newspapers, which 
demand accuracy but constantly face strict deadlines, judges would develop a 
better appreciation for how to achieve both values at the same time. 122  
Thereafter, the program for having judges undertake training outside the 
judiciary expanded to companies (with both short and long term programs), 
government ministries and agencies (two-year terms), embassies and 
consulates outside Japan (also two years), and other types of postings.123  As 
Yaguchi reflected on the establishment of this program, he stated: 
 
For companies and government ministries and agencies, setting 
up these sorts of external training programs may not be so 
difficult, but it took a great deal of resolve and a change in 
thinking for the judiciary to tackle this matter.  Within the 
                         
118  Id. at 90. 
119  See John O. Haley, Asian Law Center: The First Half Century, the First Decades: 1961–2000, in 
LEGAL INNOVATIONS IN ASIA: JUDICIAL LAWMAKING AND THE INFLUENCE OF COMPARATIVE LAW 7, 13 (John 
O. Haley & Toshiko Takenaka eds., 2014).  
120  YAGUCHI, supra note 111, at 90. 
121  See id. at 88–89. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. at 89. 
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judiciary, the illusion was widely shared that having no contact 
with the outside world was proof of judicial independence.  For 
that reason, at the start I anticipated there would be considerable 
resistance from the places we approached as settings for the 
external training experiences.  The fact we were able to achieve 
this program without meeting such resistance may reflect a 
changing in the mood of the times.124   
  
Yaguchi added, “The fact that a single system could continue for forty 
years, with no influence from changes in the societal environment, is in itself 
quite remarkable.  Moreover, it was only in the postwar era that the judiciary 
had come to be completely inbred.”125  He noted that, as a consequence of the 
establishment of the programs for overseas study and training outside the 
judiciary, some judges had become attached to the vigorous nature of those 
activities and had decided to give up their judicial careers and become 
attorneys.126  While he was sad to see this happen, he viewed it as part of the 
learning process in developing a new model for judges suited to the changing 
times.127    
 
Yaguchi earned the nickname “Mr. Judicial Administration.”128  He 
spent nearly two-thirds of his forty-two year judicial career in administrative 
posts, including serving as head of the Supreme Court’s General Secretariat 
and as head of the Civil, Administrative, and Personnel Bureaus within the 
General Secretariat.  Some critics appear to regard all his actions skeptically, 
suspecting ulterior motives aimed solely at advancing the interests of the 
judiciary.  In that vein, the lead article in a special issue on bengoshi ninkan 
(the appointment of attorneys to the judiciary) of Jiyū to Seigi, the flagship 
journal of the JFBA, published in 1993, characterized the 1988 initiative 
seeking to recruit attorneys to the judiciary, “undertaken unilaterally from on 
high, completely ignoring the bar association,” as an “effort to kill two birds 
with one stone, by filling vacancies in the understaffed judiciary while 
deflecting public criticism of judge/prosecutor exchanges.”129  
                         
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. at 90. 
127  Id. 
128  See, e.g., id. at 82. 
129  Shimomura Sachio (下村幸雄), Bengoshi Ninkan no Konnichiteki Igi (弁護士任官の今日的意義) 
[The Current Significance of Appointing Attorneys to the Judiciary], 44 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 4, at 5, 6 (1993). 
The reference to “judge/prosecutor exchanges” refers to a practice, dating from the early postwar years, in 
which a number of judges each year were seconded to the Ministry of Justice, where they served as 




Yaguchi’s reputation as “Mr. Judicial Administration” may very well 
have allowed him to push for initiatives from which others would have shied 
away from.  Whether or not he himself favored introducing the jury system to 
Japan, a strong case can be made that his willingness to place the imprimatur 
of the Chief Justice on a serious investigation of the topic opened the door to 
introduction of the lay judge system nearly twenty years later.  In any event, 
the impact of his initiative on appointing attorneys to the judiciary was 
immediate.  During the six-year period prior to 1988, there had been zero 
appointments of attorneys to the judiciary.130  Had the Supreme Court sought 
agreement with JFBA before undertaking the initiative, it likely would have 
led to protracted deliberations.  By “unilaterally” announcing the new policy, 
the judiciary was able to jump-start the process.  Although the judiciary did not 
reach its stated target of twenty new appointments per year, in 1988 five 
attorneys were appointed as judges, followed by four more appointments (two 
judges and two assistant judges) the following year.131  
 
The initiative also served as the spur to action for the bar.  After the 
initiative was announced, the bar undertook behind the scenes discussions 
with the Supreme Court and the MOJ.132  Then, following his election as 
President of JFBA in 1990, Nakabō Kōhei declared justice reform as a major 
theme of his two-year term.133  As part of its efforts, JFBA undertook a survey 
of its members regarding the Supreme Court’s initiative and related matters.134  
While over 18% of the nearly 2500 respondents regarded the initiative as 
“nothing more than a stopgap measure to meet the need for more judges,” 
nearly 80% viewed it as a step in the right direction, albeit more than half 
expressed the need for further revisions to the standards and procedures.135  
Based in part on those results, JFBA undertook formal negotiations with the 
                                                                          
prosecutors before returning to the judiciary, and a number of prosecutors were seconded to the judiciary, 
where they served as judges before returning to MOJ. This practice is discussed more fully at infra, note 258. 
For a more charitable assessment of Yaguchi’s role, see KOBAYASHI, supra note 107, at 68–69 (view that, 
throughout his career, Yaguchi sought to preserve the independence of the judiciary and raise the judiciary’s 
status). 
130  KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 233. 
131 Id. 
132  Shimomura, supra note 129, at 6. 
133  See, e.g., Intabyū: Bengoshi Ninkan Seido ni tsuite (インタビュー：弁護士任官制度について) 
[Interview: Regarding the System for Appointment of Attorneys as Judges], 44 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 4, at 42, 44 
(1993) [hereinafter Interview] (comment by Suganuma Takashi). 
134 Ōkawa Shinrō (大川真郎), Bengoshi Ninkan Suishin no Torikumi Keika (弁護士任官推進の取組み
経過) [The Progress of Efforts to Promote Bengoshi Ninkan], 44 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 4, at 20 (1993). 
135  Id. at 20. 
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Supreme Court and the MOJ, which in turn led to a three-party agreement in 
1992, as well as separate documents setting out the “main points for hiring of 
attorneys” as judges and as prosecutors.136  
 
For judges, in line with requests from JFBA, the criteria of those eligible 
for appointment was expanded from those with fifteen or more years of 
experience to those with at least five years.  Additionally, new candidates’ 
location preferences would be taken into account, and attorneys with at least 
fifteen years of experience would be posted in or near the place of their 
residence if they so desired.137  In the early 1990s, JFBA also raised the 
possibility of establishing a part-time judge system, based in part on an 
English model, in which attorneys would serve as judges for a fixed number of 
days each year (twenty to fifty, perhaps).138  About half the attorneys surveyed 
in Osaka and Tokyo expressed interest in serving as part-time judges.139  
However, given the wide range of logistical factors that would need to be 
addressed and the difficulty of incorporating a part-time system into the 
traditional career judiciary, that system was not introduced.140  
 
JFBA devoted great effort to promoting the appointment system.  So by 
the early 1990s the system clearly had entered the implementation stage—the 
stage for “translating abstract goals into practical policies.”141  Initially, those 
efforts appeared to have an impact. In 1992, a total of eight attorneys joined 
the judiciary (four judges and four assistant judges); the following year, eight 
more joined, all as judges.142  In a joint interview in early 1993, Nakabō and 
Suganuma Takashi, who served as vice chair of JFBA headquarters for 
promoting justice reform, acknowledged the numbers were not as high as they 
                         
136  These are reproduced as Materials 2 and 3 in Shiryō: Bengoshi Ninkan (資料：弁護士任官) 
[Materials: Bengoshi Ninkan], 44 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 4, at 91, 100, 101 (1993). 
137  Id., Material 2, at 100. In addition, a stipulation was included that those appointed should be willing 
to spend at least five years in the judiciary, thus explicitly leaving the door open for appointees to return to law 
practice thereafter. Id. 
138  See Aoki Masayoshi (青木正芳), Hijōkin Saibankan Seido no Ichizuke (非常勤裁判官制度の位置
づけ) [The Position of the Part-Time Judge System], 44 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 4, at 35. 
139  Id. at 41. 
140  Interview, supra note 133, at 51 (comment of Suganuma).  
141  FEELEY, supra note 7, at 37. Among those efforts, the JFBA requested the thirteen local bar 
associations with at least 200 members to establish special bodies to promote bengoshi ninkan. By 1993, ten 
of those local associations had complied. See Interview, supra note 133, at 44 (comment of Suganuma). The 
JFBA also continued to promote bengoshi ninkan with special issues and feature stories in Jiyū to Seigi. See, 
e.g., Tokushū: Bengoshi Ninkan (特集：弁護士任官) [Special Topic: Bengoshi Ninkan], 44 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 
4, at 26–34 (articles on the efforts by No. 1 Tokyo Bar Association, Osaka Bar Association, and Nagoya Bar 
Association), 61–90 (panel discussion). 
142  KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 234–35. 
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might have wished.143  They identified many challenges facing efforts to 
increase those numbers.  With respect to the attitude of the judiciary, Nakabō 
said he felt those he had dealt with, at least at the Supreme Court level, were 
actively seeking to promote hiring of attorneys, and not simply espousing their 
support as a smokescreen to hide the real aim of remedying a shortage of 
judges.144  He cautioned, however, that he was not so sure rank-and-file judges 
shared those views.  He had heard some lower court judges question whether 
appointing attorneys was a good thing, and he witnessed considerable 
resentment among attorneys that experienced lawyers were being given 
preferable treatment with regard to the location of their postings.145  
 
Nakabō and Suganuma also identified numerous challenges on the 
lawyer side, including: attachment to practice and doubts about whether 
becoming a judge is truly an appealing option, difficulty in making 
arrangements for clients and staff, and concerns about the appointment 
process.146  Nakabō had been hopeful attorneys from the larger firms would 
apply to enter the judiciary.  It would be much easier for them to arrange for 
others to take over their clients than for sole practitioners or those in small 
firms.147  Additionally, in the event they chose to return to practice, it would be 
easier to do so.  But after the first two years of the new system, by which point 
sixteen attorneys already had entered the judiciary, not one attorney from any 
of the large firms had applied.  The attitude at those firms, as Nakabō saw it, 
was that they were extremely busy and successful, and they couldn’t bear to let 
go of those who were responsible for “laying the golden egg.”148  Nakabō’s 
comment was based on a meeting he had with leaders of large firms in the 
Osaka area, who said they had too much work and too few associates to meet 
the demand.  Presumably, senior associates and junior partners at those firms 
also would have been reluctant to leave their successful practices, due to a 
sense of obligation to their clients and their firm.  The challenges mentioned 
above closely parallel concerns raised in the Investigation Committee’s 
deliberations nearly thirty years earlier.  In modest signs of hope, however, 
based on the initial two years under the new system, it did not appear that 
salary disparity, 149  concerns over pension or retirement benefits, 150  nor 
concerns over the location of postings or transfers were major barriers.151 
                         
143  Interview, supra note 133, at 48. 
144  Id. at 45–46. 
145  Id. at 46. 
146  Id. at 46–49. 
147  Id. at 49–50. 
148  Id. at 50. 
149  Interview, supra note 133, at 49. 




Despite the challenges, Nakabō and Suganuma expressed hope more 
attorneys would choose to enter the judiciary in future years.  Suganuma 
likened the initial efforts to dew falling from leaves, which in time might 
collect into a small stream and then grow to a large river.152  From that 
perspective, the results of the third year might have provided a bit of hope.  In 
1994 nine attorneys joined the judiciary.153  While only one more than in each 
of the prior two years, the trend was upward.  The momentum, however, did 
not continue.  In 1995 only three attorneys made the move, followed by six and 
seven, respectively, the next two years, and dropping to just three again in 
1998.154 
 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s 1988 initiative, followed by the joint 
efforts of JFBA and the Supreme Court, represent yet another instance of 
diagnosis or conception, together with the second full-fledged instance of 
initiation and implementation of efforts to diversify the judiciary.  One might 
even view this period as having reached the routinization stage, since the 
framework for recruiting attorneys to the judiciary continued in operation 
through the 1990s.  In any event, before the flow could even coalesce into a 
small stream, it turned back into a mere trickle. 
 
VI. THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL AND RECENT REFORMS 
 
A. Overview of the JSRC and the Reform Proposals 
 
We at last come to the most recent set of reforms.  The direct impetus 
came from a government advisory council, the JSRC, which undertook its 
deliberations in 1999.  As with the Investigation Committee of the early 1960s, 
the JSRC was established by an act of the Diet.155  In a significant shift, 
whereas nine of the Investigation Committee’s twenty members came from 
the legal profession, only three of the thirteen JSRC members came from the 
                                                                          
150  Id. at 50 (the interviewer, Sakaguchi Shigekazu (坂口繁和), noted pension benefits for judges were 
typically higher than for attorneys, and attorneys did not receive retirement allowances).  
151  Id. at 49. 
152  Id. at 52. 
153  KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 234. 
154  Id. Figures compiled by the JFBA are even lower. See White Paper, JFBA, Bengoshi Hakusho 2016 
nenban (弁護士白書 2016年版) [White Paper on Attorneys, 2016 Edition] 142 (2016) [hereinafter White 
Paper].    
155  Shihō Seido Kaikaku Shingikai Setchihō (司法制度改革審議会設置法) [Justice System Reform 
Council Establishment Act], Act No. 68 of 1999 [hereinafter JSRC Establishment Act]. 
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legal profession, one from each of the “three branches.”156  This relatively 
limited representation reflected the view that decisions over the size of the bar 
and other matters related to the justice system were so important they could no 
longer be left to the legal profession.  
 
Although the JSRC Establishment Act did not specifically refer to hōsō 
ichigen or the judicial appointment system,157 those topics clearly were within 
the Council’s broad mandate.158  The bar viewed the deliberations as an 
opportunity to renew the push for hōsō ichigen.  Indeed, in the run-up to 
establishment of the JSRC, JFBA had again begun to campaign for hōsō 
ichigen.  That campaign reportedly was triggered by then-former Chief Justice 
Yaguchi’s statement in a major newspaper in late December 1996, that “to 
achieve the people’s trust, the [hōsō] ichigen system is the most desirable 
system.”159  JFBA members again took up the call, undertaking a wide range 
of activities, including a major symposium in November 1998, which in turn 
resulted in a 450-page book on hōsō ichigen. 160   Those involved in the 
campaign also undertook outreach activities to the mass media and 
politicians.161  
 
                         
156  See JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Appendix (list of members) (the other members were 
three legal academics, two non-law academics, two business leaders, a labor union leader, a consumer 
organization leader, and a novelist).  
157  While not expressly included in the JSRC Establishment Act, resolutions attached to that Act in both 
the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors did include explicit references to hōsō ichigen. See 
(SHŪGIIN HŌMU IINKAI) SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI SETCHIHŌAN NI TAISURU FUTAI KETSUGI ((衆議院
法務委員会) 司法制度改革審議会設置法案に対する附帯決議) [(HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL AFFAIRS) SUPPLEMENTARY RESOLUTION REGARDING THE BILL FOR THE JSRC 
ESTABLISHMENT ACT] (1999), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/990803syugiin.html; see also (SANGIIN 
HŌMU IINKAI) SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI SETCHIHŌAN NI TAISURU FUTAI KETSUGI  
((参議院法務委員会)司法制度改革審議会設置法案に対する附帯決議) [(HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS 
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL AFFAIRS) SUPPLEMENTARY RESOLUTION REGARDING THE BILL FOR THE JSRC 
ESTABLISHMENT ACT] (1999), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/990803sangiin.html. 
158  JSRC Establishment Act, art. 2 (the JSRC was established for the following purposes: “to clarify the 
role to be played by justice in Japanese society in the 21st century; and to examine and deliberate fundamental 
measures necessary for the realization of a justice system that is easy for the people to utilize, measures 
necessary for participation by the people in the justice system, measures necessary for . . . strengthening the 
functions of the legal profession, and other reforms of the justice system, as well as improvements in the 
infrastructure of that system”).  
159  KOBAYASHI, supra note 107, at 161; see also Yaguchi Kōichi (谷口洪一), “Hōso Ichigen” no Seido 
to Kokoro （「法曹一元」の制度と心) [The System and Spirit of “Hōsō Ichigen”], 49 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 7, at 
14 (1998) (Yaguchi’s comment appeared in the Mainichi Shinbun on December 23, 1996. Yaguchi expanded 
on those views in a speech at the Osaka Bar Association on March 9, 1998, which was published as the lead-in 
to a special feature on hōsō ichigen in the July 1998 issue of Jiyū to Seigi. 
160  See KOBAYASHI, supra note 107, at 161–62. 
161  See id. 
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Many proponents sought to tie expansion in the size of the legal 
profession to hōsō ichigen.  As we have seen, calls for a substantial rise in the 
number of bar exam passers dated back at least as far as the Investigation 
Committee’s recommendations in 1964.162  The bar initially refused to engage 
in discussions of the issue.  As pressure rose over the years, the bar continued 
to resist, and then engaged in a series of grudging concessions.  Indeed, it was 
that recalcitrant attitude, above all, that led to the decision to limit the legal 
profession’s representation on the JSRC.163  When the pressure continued to 
intensify in the 1990s, members of the bar sought to treat agreement to hōsō 
ichigen as a quid pro quo for concessions to increases in the number of bar 
exam passers.164  
 
The lawyer representative on the JSRC was Nakabō.  He sought to link 
debates over the size of the legal profession and reforms to the legal training 
system with hōsō ichigen.165  Other Council members expressed skepticism 
about the feasibility and desirability of moving to a system in which judges 
would come only from among experienced lawyers. 166   Then, when it 
appeared the deliberations might become deadlocked, during an all-day 
session in August 2000, Nakabō stated in essence that the term hōsō ichigen 
was just a slogan.  He also posited that use of the phrase easily could lead to 
the misapprehension that all lawyers would become judges or that lawyers 
would choose all the judges, and that it would be better if some new word 
could be devised that would not have the baggage associated with hōsō 
ichigen.167  
 
Some members of the bar seem to regard Nakabō as a traitor for having 
made that concession.  In subsequent years some of the attacks on the increase 
in the size of the legal profession have cited hōsō ichigen, implying that the bar 
was misled into supporting the increased number of passers by the false 
expectation of achieving hōsō ichigen in return.168  However, in the context of 
the JSRC, Nakabo’s concession cleared the way forward.  Previously, 
                         
162  See supra notes 87, 96–97 and accompanying text. 
163  See KOBAYASHI, supra note 107 at 80–118 (providing a detailed examination of the debates within 
the bar and the impact of the bar’s recalcitrance on outside opinions). 
164  See id. at 162, 167–70, 200–12. 
165  See id. at 200–12. 
166  See id. 
167  See JSRC, Minutes for the 3rd Day of Concentrated Deliberations (2000), 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/natu/natu3gijiroku.html.  
168  See, e.g., Kuboi Kazumasa (久保井一匡), Chokusetsushugi/Kōtōshugi o Kōtai Saseru na (直接主
義・口頭主義を後退させるな) [Do Not Let The Principles of Directness and Orality Regress], RONKYŪ 
JURISUTO NO. 2 at 99 (2012); KOBAYASHI, supra note 107, at 214, 220.  
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members had undertaken discussion of qualities desired for judges;169 after 
Nakabo’s statement, the Council proceeded to discuss how best to achieve its 
vision for the judiciary, given the realities of the Japanese situation.170  In the 
words of Takeshita Morio, a former judge who served as Vice Chair of the 
JSRC and also was co-author of the leading treatise on the judiciary:171  
 
In our Council, from the start of discussions on reforms to the 
judge system, nearly all of us were in agreement that the focus of 
our deliberations should be on how to appoint and train high 
quality judges who will be the bearers of the Japanese justice 
system in the 21st century, and that the old way of framing the 
question as simply a debate over whether or not to adopt hōsō 
ichigen was not appropriate.172 
 
The JSRC did not call for abolition of the assistant judge system or a 
wholesale move to appointment only of experienced lawyers.  To the contrary, 
the Council expressly recognized that appointment of assistant judges directly 
upon completion of the LTRI would continue to constitute a major route for 
entry into the judiciary.  Nonetheless, the Council’s final report strongly 
endorsed the goal of diversification through its use of phrases such as 
“form[ing] and nurtur[ing] a justice system that can genuinely meet the 
public’s expectations and trust” 173  and references to the importance of 
securing judges “with abundant, diversified knowledge and experience.”174  
 
To achieve these ends, the JSRC set forth two major recommendations.  
Notably, the first reform, was not increased appointment of practicing lawyers 
to the bench.  To the contrary, the first reform proposed a mechanism to ensure 
career judges gained broader exposure outside of the judiciary.  This proposal 
paralleled and expanded on the efforts spearheaded by Yaguchi in the 1970s 
and 1980s to have judges spend periods of time outside the judiciary, 
                         
169  See JSRC, Minutes for the 2nd Day of Concentrated Deliberations (2000), 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/natu/natu2gijiroku.html. 
170  By being designated as an aide to a JSRC member, I had the opportunity to attend the all-day meeting 
where Nakabō made that statement. Even though at that time I was not fully steeped in the history of the hōsō 
ichigen debate, I could sense a hush and a collective sense of relief among other members of the Council when 
he did so. 
171  KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22. 
172  SATŌ KŌJI (佐藤幸治), TAKESHITA MORIO (竹下守夫) & INOUYE MASAHITO (井上正仁), SHIHŌ 
SEIDO KAIKAKU (司法制度改革) [JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM] 293–94 (2002) [hereinafter JUSTICE SYSTEM 
REFORM]. 
173  JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III. 
174  Id. at Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1. 
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experiencing other settings.  The fact that the Council listed this reform first 
presumably reflected its view that the existing career system has many 
strengths, and that the system for appointing practicing lawyers as judges 
would not expand rapidly.  In concrete terms, the JSRC called for the 
establishment of a system “to ensure . . . that, in principle, all assistant judges” 
would “leave their status as judges . . . for a reasonably long period suited to 
obtaining meaningful experience” and “gather diversified experience as legal 
professionals in positions other than the judiciary . . . , such as lawyer, public 
prosecutor, etc.” before returning to the judiciary.175  
 
There was a difference of opinion as to how long the “reasonably long 
period” should last.  According to one view, about five years would be 
appropriate.  While that clearly was a minority view, there was strong support 
for the view that six months or one year would be too short.176  If the period 
were that short, the JSRC members agreed, the assistant judges would end up 
just being treated as “guests.”177   Opinions also differed on what should 
qualify as appropriate experience outside the judiciary.  As noted above, the 
JSRC recommendations called for “diversified experience as legal 
professionals,” with specific reference to positions “such as lawyer, public 
prosecutor, etc.”  The same paragraph went on to say: “In addition, experience 
of other types that is considered equally beneficial, in elevating the quality of 
judges, to the types of experiences described above may also be included, but 
further consideration must be given to the specific contents of such other types 
of experiences.”178  As an example of one of the other types of experiences that 
might be considered, Takeshita expressed the view that, especially given the 
rise in internationalization, study at an overseas university should count as 
appropriate “diversified experience.”179 
 
One other aspect of the recommendation that bears note is the JSRC’s 
call for the judiciary to “systematically ensure” assistant judges gather 
diversified experience outside the judiciary.  The Council stated, “such steps 
might be considered as reexamining the criteria for appointment of judges or 
placing weight on these types of experience in selecting judges . . . In any 
event, effective measures shall be established.”180 
 
                         
175  Id. at Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(1)a(a). 
176  JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM, supra note 172, at 300 (comment by Satō). 
177  Id. at 299. 
178  JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(1)a(a). 
179  JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM, supra note 172, at 301 (comment by Takeshita). 
180   JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(1)a(a). 
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The second reform proposal listed was invigoration of the system for 
appointing judges from among experienced attorneys.  In this regard, the 
Council stated: 
 
In order to realize the import of Article 42 of the Courts Act, 
which anticipates that judges will be drawn from a variety of 
sources, and to respond to the substantial increases in the number 
of judges needed . . . it is necessary to promote strongly the 
appointment of lawyers as judges, which has long been overdue.  
For this it is indispensable that the Supreme Court and JFBA 
build a constant and close cooperative framework.181 
 
The Council made clear that its concept of diversification of appointments 
extended broadly, adding: “[I]t goes without saying that, based upon the spirit 
of diversification of the sources of supply for judges in Article 42 of the Courts 
Act, it is desirable that appointment not be limited to assistant judges and 
lawyers but include vigorous appointment of public prosecutors and legal 
scholars, who also are legal professionals.”182 
 
From a United States perspective, it is intriguing to see that the Council 
suggested a third category of reform that might have helped diversify the 
judiciary: institution of a “research clerk system” at the High Court and 
District Court levels, along the lines of the United States judicial clerk 
system.183  This suggestion did not go totally unnoticed,184 but it never was 
implemented and appears to have disappeared from view. 
 
In contrast, the Supreme Court and JFBA both expressed support for the 
other two major reform proposals.  As to the proposal for diversifying the 
experiences of assistant judges, the Supreme Court noted the need to 
overcome hurdles such as securing appropriate placement locations to receive 
the assistant judges, handling the additional workload created by their 
absence, and working out details on such matters as compensation and 
                         
181  Id. at Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(2). 
182  Id. 
183  Id. at Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(3) (“[F]rom the standpoint of building courts with firm foundations and at the 
same time providing one mechanism by which those from outside the courts can obtain experience within the 
judiciary, consideration should be given to . . . appointing qualified legal professionals and others with 
learning and experience as a sort of law clerk attached to a judge (or judges) . . . .”). 
184  See, e.g., Saitō Hiroshi (斎藤浩), Myōga Hideki （明賀英樹), Ogawa Tatsuo (小川達雄) & Aikawa 
Yutaka (相川裕), Saibankan Seido no Kaikaku (裁判官制度の改革) [Reform of the Judge System], 52 JIYŪ 
TO SEIGI, no. 8, at 74, 78 (2001).  
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benefits.  In early 2003, however, the Supreme Court announced that, once 
these hurdles were overcome, following an initial implementation stage all 
assistant judges would have the opportunity to spend two years gaining 
experience outside the judiciary.185  The Diet passed enabling legislation in 
2004.186  Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court and JFBA entered into an 
agreement to cooperate in arranging appropriate placements, as well as on 
other aspects of the new system;187 the first placements in law firms began in 
April 2005.188 
 
The bench and the bar also both publicly embraced the calls for 
invigoration of the system for appointing experienced lawyers as judges.  Even 
before the JSRC issued its final recommendations, the Supreme Court and 
JFBA released a joint declaration confirming their agreement that “it is very 
important to greatly increase the number of attorneys appointed to the 
judiciary” and pledging to discuss and cooperate on efforts to promote that 
goal, setting forth a long list of concrete measures to be discussed.189  
 
                         
185  Memorandum, Saikō Saibansho Jimu Sōkyoku (最高裁判所事務総局) [Supreme Court General 
Secretariat], Hanjiho no Keiken no Tayōka ni tsuite (判事補の経験の多様化について) [Regarding 
Diversification of Experience for Assistant Judges] (March 18, 2003), 
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/80614006.pdf.  
186  Hanjiho oyobi Kenji no Bengoshi Shokumu Keiken ni kansuru Hōritsu (判事補及び検事の弁護士
職務経験に関する法律) [Act Concerning Experience as Attorneys for Assistant Judges and Prosecutors], 
Act No. 121 of 2004 [hereinafter Act Concerning Experience as Attorneys]. 
187 Memorandum, Saikō Saibansho, Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai (最高裁判所、日本弁護士連合会) 
[Supreme Court, JFBA], Hanjiho no Bengoshi Shokumu Keiken Seido ni kansuru Torimatome（判事補の弁
護士職務経験制度に関する取りまとめ） [Arrangement of Matters Relating to the System for Experience 
in Work as Attorneys for Assistant Judges] (June 23, 2004), 
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/judical_reform/data/hanji_torimatome.pdf [hereinafter Arrangement 
of Matters].  
188  See Tokushū 1: Saibankan/Kensatsukan no Bengoshi Shokumu Keiken (特集１：裁判官・検察官
の弁護士職務) [Special Feature 1: Work Experience as Attorneys for Judges and Prosecutors], 59 JIYŪ TO 
SEIGI, no. 12, at 9 (2008) (examining the system for placement of assistant judges in law firms). See also 
Hamada Hiromichi (濱田広道), Bengoshi Shokumu Keiken Seido no Genjō to Kadai (弁護士職務経験制度
の現状と課題) [Current Circumstances of and Challenges for the Attorney Work Experience System], 59 
JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 12, at 9 (2008). 
189  Memorandum, Saikō Saibansho Jimu Sōkyoku, Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai (最高裁判所事務総局、
日本弁護士連合会) [Supreme Court General Secretariat, JFBA], Bengoshi Ninkan o Suishin Suru tame no 
Gutaiteki Sochi no Teian ni tsuite (弁護士任官を推進するための具体的措置の提案について) 
[Regarding the Proposal for Concrete Steps to Promote the Appointment of Lawyers as Judges] (2001), 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/kentoukai/seido/dai2/2siryou_sa-be1.html. 
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B. Potential Facilitating and Impeding Factors: The Feeley 
Framework 
 
As we have seen, prior to this recent set of reforms, Japan had gone 
through at least five prior instances of diagnosis or conception of the value of 
diversification of the judiciary, including at least two prior instances of 
initiation and implementation of reforms.  Yet each of the past efforts had 
stalled.  Was there any reason to think this time around might be more 
successful?  
 
To answer, let us begin by returning to Feeley’s framework.  In his 
Introduction, he identified numerous factors as potentially aiding reform 
efforts. With reference to prior research, he posited that:  
 
[P]lanned change is most likely to succeed in institutions where: 
 
・highly trained professionals perform complex tasks 
 
・authority is diffused and flexible rather than centralized 
 
・duties are left ambiguous rather than formally codified in detail 
 
・roles and mobility are flexible rather than rigidly stratified.190 
 
These features presumably might facilitate reform by allowing 
experimentation and innovation by highly trained and committed 
professionals, with successful innovations then expanded.  As Feeley noted, in 
the United States “courts are not bound by rigid centralized authority, [a] 
condition that facilitates initiative and fosters innovation.”191 He cautioned, 
though, “courts are enmeshed in a web of rules that can be and often are 
inimical to change.  Those comfortable with current practices selectively 
invoke these rules to impede change.”192  Furthermore, “because courts are 
rigidly segmented, broad perspectives and system-wide thinking are 
discouraged and innovation is stifled.”193  
 
                         
190  FEELEY, supra note 7, at 38; see also JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2 (referencing the 
perspective developed by Jerald Hage & Michael Aiken in SOCIAL CHANGE IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 
(1970)).  
191  FEELEY, supra note 7, at 38. 
192  Id. 
193  Id. 
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As noted earlier, after undertaking a thorough review of several 
concrete criminal court reform efforts in the United States in Chapter 6 of his 
book, on Assessment, Feeley set forth an even longer list of impediments to 
change.  Feeley began by highlighting several impediments to even thinking 
about change.  He noted that reform efforts often arise out of a sense of crisis, 
without a sense of historical perspective.  He observed, “A historical 
perspective shows that many problems have long histories and stem from 
deep-seated and insoluble tensions, and that the typical stance of others is to 
resist and adapt, not to embrace reforms.”194  In contrast, he stated, in criminal 
courts in the United States “bold crusades are undertaken against 
little-understood enemies, often fanned by an atmosphere of crisis.”  In this 
“crisis thinking” context, “[i]n order to mobilize public support, reformers 
must offer dramatic plans that are both vague and simple.  But these very 
strategies that facilitate innovation undercut implementation.”195  
 
Feeley next turned to another set of impediments: the role of outsiders in 
the efforts at reform.  Given the parallels and contrasts to the Japanese 
situation, a somewhat extended set of quotes is warranted: 
 
Given the lack of incentives for system-wide changes within the 
courts, it is not surprising that innovations should often occur 
from outsiders.  Thus, another dilemma: those who are in the best 
position to assess the needs of the courts have the least incentive 
to innovate, while those who have the incentive do not have the 
detailed knowledge. 
 
If change is initiated from within one part of the court, it is likely 
to affect the internal operations of that agency and only indirectly 
the whole system. . . . Such changes are likely to have only 
marginal effect on other court operations.  But if a single agency 
unilaterally implements a new policy that has system-wide 
impact, then it is likely to be greeted with resistance and 
adaptation. 
 
In the long run, two factors reinforce each other and contribute to 
the lack of innovation in the . . . courts.  First is the need for the 
various officials—even though nominal adversaries—to 
cooperate . . . . Second—because the courts possess hydraulic 
                         
194  Id. at 192–93. 
195  Id. at 192. 
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qualities in which each component can effectively thwart changes 
– is the lack of incentive to try to change. 
 
If . . . justice officials have few incentives to initiate system-wide 
innovations, then who does?  People and agencies outside 
the . . . courts . . . . 
 
While outsiders may be able to transcend the limited perspectives 
and incentives of those who work daily in the . . . courts, their 
remoteness from the courts prevents them from understanding the 
byzantine realities of the . . . justice process, and, as a result, their 
efforts are often misdirected. Furthermore, they rarely have a 
continuing concern with the problems . . . Indeed, success to 
many outsiders means adoption, like passing a new law or 
announcing a new ruling. Continuing interest and the authority to 
deal with the many factors that can subvert new policies are 
needed.196 
 
Feeley next considered impediments to implementation of reforms.  
Here, he highlighted three key problems: fragmentation, newness, and 
premature judgment.  He explains those problems as follows: “First, the 
fragmentation of the criminal justice system facilitates judgments of success 
even as reform efforts fail.  Second, many reforms have sought to circumvent 
the sluggish institutions by creating new programs, but these quickly become 
part of the problem.  Third, success of programs has often been declared 
prematurely.”197  
 
On top of all these problems, Feeley identified additional clusters of 
issues relating both to the stages of routinizing the reforms and evaluating 
them.  As to the former, he stated: “It is rare to find an innovation that is 
carefully initiated and even rarer to see one successfully implemented.  But it 
is rarer still to find a workable new idea well institutionalized.” 198   He 
observed: “While innovations may be adhered to at the outset, once financial 
reality has set in and the glare of publicity has declined, there is great incentive 
to revert to old practices.”199  He added:  
 
                         
196  Id. at 196–97. 
197  Id. at 198. 
198  Id. at 200. 
199  Id. at 201. 
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Successful innovators are rarely successful administrators.  New 
programs experience a rapid loss of moral fervor: charismatic 
spokespeople are replaced by bureaucrats . . . young and 
enthusiastic staffs age . . . co-optation and adaptation become 
necessary for survival.  Concern for original goals gives way to 
concern for organizational maintenance and the program 
objectives of the new generation of administrators.200 
 
Finally, as to problems with respect to evaluation, Feeley first pointed to 
“lack of incentive.”  He commented, “Proponents of reform have little 
incentive to evaluate; they know their ideas are good . . . . Administrators fear 
evaluation, a process that, if pursued honestly, must either hold programs to 
their promises or reveal unpleasant realities.”201  He noted another similar 
issue: “The more rigorous an evaluation is, the more likely it is to sound 
inconclusive . . . . what is sound practice for the researcher is seen as 
obfuscation by the policy maker, who wants simple yes or no answers.”202  He 
further observed that, “New programs are subject to unanticipated obstacles 
that can retard or derail them.  Both programs and evaluations must be 
flexible; but this flexibility in turn facilitates manipulation and distortion.”203 
 
For all these reasons, Feeley reached a rather pessimistic conclusion, 
stating: 
 
Scholars are finding that many innovative programs fail in their 
implementation.  This book suggests that the picture is bleaker: 
the causes of failure are found at every stage of planned change.  
Often, failure is rooted in conception, in a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of the problem, the dynamics of 
the system, the nature of the change process, and attention to 




The central and continuing obstacles to change in the . . . justice 
system are fragmentation and adaptation, and there are two 
                         
200  Id. 
201  Id. at 202 (emphasis in original). 
202  FEELEY, supra note 7, at 203. 
203  Id. at 204. 
204  Id. at 205. 
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approaches to coping with them.  We can seek increased 
coordination, or we can devise a strategy that takes these 
conditions into account . . . . The dominant approach taken in 
reforms examined in this book has been the former, to seek 
improvements through greater coordination and better 
management.  This approach can be called administrative.  
Administrative changes try to impose a bureaucratic form on an 
inherently antagonistic adversarial system . . . . 
 
Perhaps the greatest danger in the administrative strategy is that it 
will work, that it will transform a contentious and embattled 
group of professionals into cooperative bureaucrats . . . . 
 
In the short run, administrative reforms may appear successful, 
but once institutionalized, they can easily become part of the 
fragmentation that is the source of so many problems.205 
 
C.  Potential Facilitating and Impeding Factors: The Case of Japan 
 
How might these observations apply to Japan?  To arrange suitable 
placements for assistant judges to ensure they gain broader exposure outside 
the judiciary requires cooperation by a broad range of other entities.  That said, 
the reforms aimed at diversifying the Japanese judiciary primarily involve two 
major institutions: the judiciary and the bar.  
 
Looking first at the facilitating factors identified by Feeley, both the 
bench and the bar are composed of highly trained and committed 
professionals.  For the bar, other features of what Feeley described as 
“institutions” where “planned change is most likely to succeed” also apply.  
While the task of coordinating with the Supreme Court inevitably would fall to 
the national body, JFBA, even that body is far from monolithic.  The JFBA 
presidency changes every two years and vice presidents, drawn from local bar 
associations across Japan, change every year.  Moreover, local bar associations 
might (and did) develop their own systems and strategies for encouraging 
attorneys to apply for the judiciary and for screening the candidates.  So, on the 
bar side, the potential for experimentation and innovation exists; and, through 
symposia presentations and publications about the various efforts, other local 
bar associations could learn from the successful initiatives. 
                         
205  Id. at 205–06. 




In the case of the judiciary, however, the other features of “institutions” 
where “planned change is most likely to succeed” do not apply.  Chief Justice 
Yaguchi provides a striking example that individual initiative can play an 
important role, even within the highly bureaucratized Japanese judiciary.  
Although Yaguchi’s long and distinguished career and well-earned reputation 
as “Mr. Judicial Administration,” not to mention his positions as head of the 
Personnel Bureau, Secretary General, and Chief Justice, allowed him to take 
such decisive action, he is far from representative of the judiciary as a whole. 
 
In prior works, I have characterized Japan’s judiciary as a “nameless, 
faceless” judiciary.206  Japanese judges operate in near anonymity.  Their 
names may be a matter of public record, but their backgrounds and 
personalities are almost completely unknown to the general public.  This 
relative anonymity, I have argued, is consistent with the dominant ethos of the 
Japanese judiciary, an ethos of uniformity.  Within the judiciary, great weight 
is placed on respect for precedent, thereby helping ensure uniformity in 
outcomes.  Efforts also are made to standardize matters ranging from size of 
awards and length of prison sentences, to opinion format, writing style, and 
courtroom design.  In accordance with the view (or myth) that the identity of 
the judge does not matter, it is even accepted that judges may change midway 
through trials.  
Thus, within the Japanese judiciary, authority is not diffused and 
flexible; rather, it is highly centralized.  Formal codification of duties may not 
be announced publicly, but one can be sure that within the judiciary there are 
clear sets of norms judges are expected to observe.  Failure to conform to those 
norms may affect a judge’s future advancement and postings.207  Finally, roles 
and mobility are not flexible.  They change over time, as judges are assigned to 
new positions, but the career system is stratified and roles for each position are 
quite clearly defined.  Given these features, one would not expect the Japanese 
judiciary to be a hotbed for individual initiative.  
 
                         
206  This is the central thesis of a book in Japanese, DANIEL H. FOOTE, NA MO NAI KAO MO NAI SHIHŌ: 
NIHON NO SAIBAN WA KAWARU NO KA (名もない顔もない司法：日本の裁判は変わるのか) [NAMELESS 
FACELESS JUSTICE: WILL JAPAN’S COURTS CHANGE?] (Tamaruya Masayuki (溜箭将之) trans., 2007). 
Aspects of the thesis are discussed in Daniel H. Foote, Restrictions on Political Activity by Judges in Japan 
and the United States: The Cases of Judge Teranishi and Justice Sanders, 8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 
285 (2009); Foote, Transparency, supra note 6; Foote, Recent Reforms, supra note 6. 
207  See, e.g., Haley, supra note 22; J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003); J. MARK RAMSEYER, SECOND-BEST 
JUSTICE: THE VIRTUES OF JAPANESE PRIVATE LAW 206–21 (2015). 
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Accordingly, most of the key features Feeley identified as factors 
facilitating reform decidedly do not apply to the Japanese judiciary.  
Nonetheless, in other respects, the structure and fundamental mindset of the 
judiciary hold great potential for achieving meaningful reform, provided the 
requisite will exists.  This is a theme to which I will return below. 
 
Before elaborating on that point, however, let us consider how Feeley’s 
long list of factors impeding change apply in the case of efforts to diversify the 
Japanese judiciary.  On at least two prior occasions when the topic of hōsō 
ichigen arose, in the immediate postwar era and the early 1960s, the judiciary 
faced a serious shortage of judges, so in that sense an “atmosphere of crisis” 
may have existed.  And, as with Wagatsuma, over the years, many observers 
have felt the bar’s advocacy for a full-fledged hōsō ichigen system was 
offering the sort of “dramatic plans that are both vague and simple” that Feeley 
referred to as characteristic of efforts by reformers to mobilize public support, 
without sufficient attention to the difficulties in implementation.  Even in 
earlier cycles of the debate, however, considerable weight was given to 
historical perspective.  Historical perspective played a strong role in the 
deliberations of the JSRC and the resulting recommendations.  After all, 
among the members of the Council, Nakabō himself had played a central role 
in the bar’s efforts to promote hōsō ichigen/bengoshi ninkan in the 1990s, and 
Takeshita was co-author of the leading treatise on the judiciary, which 
included a detailed examination of prior reform efforts.  One of the other 
members, moreover, was a recently retired career judge (Fujita Kōzō (藤田耕
三), and the Council assembled a great deal of information about and received 
testimony from many representatives of the judiciary.   
As to Feeley’s observations regarding premature judgment, the 
Japanese bar had witnessed so many prior efforts to promote the appointment 
of attorneys to the bench that it was scarcely inclined to declare success 
prematurely, to be satisfied only with unilateral pledges by the judiciary, or 
even bilateral agreements between the Supreme Court and JFBA announcing 
the adoption of a new policy or renewed commitment to reform.  At the same 
time, prior history had shown many examples bearing out Feeley’s 
observations that “[n]ew programs experience a rapid loss of moral fervor: 
charismatic spokespeople are replaced by bureaucrats . . . young and 
enthusiastic staffs age . . . .”  The bar and other observers, undoubtedly, were 
well aware of the need to monitor progress and maintain momentum over the 
long term. 
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However, it is in connection with Feeley’s observations about 
fragmentation that one finds the greatest differences between the situations in 
the United States and Japan.  As alluded to above, Japan’s judiciary is not 
highly fragmented.  To the contrary, it is highly centralized, with a very strong 
administrative apparatus contained in the Supreme Court General Secretariat.  
In many respects, relations between the bench and the bar are “inherently 
antagonistic” and “adversarial.”  Yet when it comes to the judiciary itself, there 
is a firmly embedded bureaucratic system with deep historical roots.  As 
Miyazawa Setsuo has observed, “the [Japanese] judiciary, given its 
long-standing tradition of a highly stable judicial administrative body centered 
on personnel management, possesses very strong capacity to effectuate 
policy,”208 provided the policy accords with the internal views of the judiciary.  
 
Thus, the fundamental structure already exists for the Japanese judiciary 
to undertake what Feeley labels as an “administrative” approach, “seek[ing] 
improvements through greater coordination and better management.”  The 
well-established administrative apparatus enables the judiciary to undertake 
careful investigation of matters from a system-wide perspective.  Once the 
decision is made to proceed with a new initiative, the judiciary can implement 
that initiative on a coordinated, nationwide basis.209  Furthermore, in the event 
the Supreme Court General Secretariat has put its weight behind a certain 
initiative, there is relatively little fear that a rogue element within the judiciary 
would “effectively thwart” the change.  Accordingly, while in a different form 
from the factors likely to facilitate reform highlighted in the United States 
context by Feeley, the Japanese judiciary’s capacity to implement new 
measures on a system-wide basis constitutes one possible reason for optimism 
about prospects for meaningful reform. 
 
D.  Concrete Facilitating Factors and Challenges for the Recent 
Reforms 
 
                         
208  Miyazawa Setsuo (宮澤節生), Seisakushikōteki Gendaigata Soshō no Genjō to Shihō Seido Kaikaku 
Keizoku no Hitsuyōsei (政策志向的現代型訴訟の現状と司法制度改革継続の必要性) [The Current State 
of Policy-Oriented Contemporary Litigation and the Necessity for Continued Justice System Reform], 63 
HŌSHAKAIGAKU 46, 64 (2005). 
209  At the risk of conflicting with Matthew Wilson’s assessment in his article in this symposium issue, I 
would offer the lay judge system as an example of a reform in which the Japanese judiciary’s extensive 
planning efforts facilitated smooth implementation. In this connection, see, e.g., Daniel H. Foote, Citizen 
Participation: Appraising the Saiban’in System, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 756 (2014); WILSON, FUKURAI & 
MARUTA, supra note 1, at 38–58. 
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With that examination of the potential facilitating and impeding factors 
in Japan as a general matter, let us now turn to a concrete examination of 
factors affecting the recent reforms.  In considering these matters, I will focus 
initially on the second reform proposal, aimed at invigorating the system for 
appointment of practicing lawyers (and other legal professionals) to the bench.  
Under the rubric of hōsō ichigen or bengoshi ninkan, that had been the primary 
focus of diversification efforts since at least the 1930s.  The efforts to 
invigorate such appointments have continued to receive the bulk of attention 
by the bar and other observers since the JSRC issued its recommendations.  
After examining that set of reforms, I will turn to the efforts aimed at ensuring 
assistant judges gain experience outside the judiciary. 
 
1. Appointment of Attorneys to the Judiciary 
 
Looking back to 2001, at the outset of the initiation and implementation 
phases, one can identify various reasons for hoping that the latest reform 
efforts might be more successful than earlier attempts to promote the 
appointment of experienced attorneys to the judiciary.  The first such factor is 
the perceived strength of the commitment.  As noted above, in May 2001, even 
before the JSRC issued its final report, the Supreme Court and JFBA 
announced their agreement to undertake discussions of concrete measures to 
promote such appointments.  After a series of meetings, in December 2001 
they issued a joint statement setting forth concrete steps to be taken on both 
sides.210   Thereafter, JFBA and the local bar undertook a wide range of 
activities to promote so-called bengoshi ninkan. 211  Major bar associations 
sought to recruit attorneys willing to serve as judges and established 
committees to review candidates.  In November 2002, JFBA held a major 
symposium, at which organizers proudly announced that arrangements had 
been made for twenty attorneys to join the judiciary in 2003.  They also set 
forth projections that the annual numbers would rise steadily to 100 new 
appointees by 2011, along with a simulation that, by continuing at that level 
thereafter, by the year 2030 attorney appointees would constitute over 40% of 
                         
210 Compilation, Saikō Saibansho, Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai (最高裁判所、日本弁護士連合会) 
[Supreme Court, JFBA], Bengoshi Ninkan tō ni kansuru Kyōgi no Torimatome （弁護士任官等に関する協
議の取りまとめ） [Compilation of Discussions Regarding Appointment of Attorneys as Judges, etc.] (Dec. 
7, 2001), http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/judical_reform/data/kyougi.pdf [hereinafter Torimatome]. 
211  The promotional activities included many symposia and other gatherings to promote bengoshi 
ninkan and the publication of numerous personal accounts by attorneys who had entered the judiciary. The 
JFBA even produced a promotional video extolling the virtues of becoming a judge, entitled Shimin wa Anata 
no Saibankan Ninkan o Mattemasu (市民はあなたの裁判官任官をまってます) [The People Are Waiting 
for You to Become a Judge] (shown at 7th meeting of JFBA Citizens’ Council, July 26, 2005).  
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all judges, well on the way to true hōsō ichigen.212  The bar has continued to 
undertake efforts to promote bengoshi ninkan ever since.213 
 
There are several structural matters that point to potential factors in 
expanding appointments of practicing lawyers to the bench.  The first is a great 
expansion in the size of the bar.  Even though the JSRC’s vision of 3000 bar 
exam passers per year, which was to have been achieved by about 2010, has 
never been reached, the overall number of attorneys has more than doubled 
since 2001.214  Accordingly, the potential supply of attorneys is much greater 
than in the past.  
 
The past two decades have also witnessed a great increase in large and 
medium-sized law firms.215  As noted earlier, in the 1990s Nakabō and others 
involved in efforts to promote bengoshi ninkan expressed hope that lawyers 
from large firms would join the judiciary, since they would find it easier to 
arrange others to take over their clients and staff and would have a smoother 
path to returning to practice later.  In their discussions in 2001, the Supreme 
Court and JFBA also identified the rise in large firms as an important structural 
factor for the same reasons.216  
 
In terms of numerical factors, perhaps the most promising basis for hope 
in the increased hiring of attorneys was the JSRC call for a “great increase” in 
the number of judges.  The Council concluded that the “insufficient number of 
judges” was already a “serious problem.”  Given the likelihood that litigation 
would rise in the future, it observed, further increases probably would be 
needed.217  Furthermore, it called for the phased elimination of the so-called 
tokurei hanjiho (special assistant judge) system.  Under this system, if 
“specially designated” by the Supreme Court, assistant judges with over five 
years of experience are empowered to exercise the same authority as judges.  
This includes handling cases on their own, rather than just as a junior member 
of a three-judge panel.218  The system was authorized by law in 1948, 219 
                         
212  See Ōshima Hisaaki (大島久明), Bengoshi Ninkan no Gendankai to Kadai (弁護士任官の現段階
と課題) [The Current Stage of Bengoshi Ninkan and Issues], 61 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 8, at 10–11 (2010). 
213  As one of many examples, in January 2008 JIYŪ TO SEIGI began a monthly series of reflections by 
attorneys who had entered the judiciary entitled Bengoshi Ninkan no Mado （弁護士任官の窓）[Window on 
Bengoshi Ninkan], which continues to run to this day, having now reached over 140 installments. 
214  White Paper, supra note 154, at 30 (37,680 registered attorneys as of March 31, 2016). 
215  See, e.g., Yasuharu Nagashima & E. Anthony Zaloom, The Rise of the Large Japanese Business Law 
Firm and Its Prospects for the Future, in A TURNING POINT, supra note 3, at 136. 
216 See Torimatome, supra note 210. 
217  JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 1, § 2(1). 
218  Id. at Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(b). 
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originally as a “temporary” measure to respond to the shortage of judges.  The 
system soon became entrenched.  Nearly all assistant judges with over five 
years of experience have been “specially designated.”220  As the Council 
observed, eliminating this system would necessitate hiring more judges, 
explicitly adding, “to accomplish this, appointment of lawyers and others as 
judges should be promoted.”221 
 
Apart from these numerical factors, several concrete measures 
identified in the joint discussions of JFBA and the Supreme Court might have 
appeared as facilitating factors.222  For example, the bar agreed to establish one 
or more law firms that could assume responsibility for matters being handled 
by lawyers who entered the judiciary and that could provide initial 
employment for those returning to practice after serving on the bench.  On the 
bench side, the Supreme Court agreed to promote a variety of options for 
attorneys entering the judiciary, including short-term judgeships; 223 
judgeships for specialized fields, such as bankruptcy, intellectual property, 
commercial matters, and family law matters (including the possibility of 
short-term specialized positions); 224  and part-time judgeships.  As to the 
part-time judgeships, the Supreme Court felt constitutional concerns would be 
raised by allowing practicing lawyers to handle actual trials on a part-time 
basis.  However, “given the expectation that the part-time system would 
promote the system for appointment of attorneys as full-time judges,” the 
Supreme Court pledged to investigate introduction of a system in which 
attorneys would handle civil and family conciliation matters on a part-time 
basis.225 
 
In the 1990s, one of the concerns raised by the bar was that the 
appointment process was handled entirely by the judiciary, with no third-party 
                                                                          
219 Hanjiho no Shokken no Tokurei tō ni kansuru Hōritsu (判事補の職権の特例等に関する法律) [Act 
Regarding Special Exceptions, etc., for Authority of Assistant Judges], Act No. 146 of 1948.  
220  See, e.g., JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM, supra note 172, at 304 (comment of Satō). 
221  JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(b). 
222  The measures discussed in this paragraph were contained in Torimatome, supra note 210. 
223  While using the expression “short term,” the Supreme Court insisted on a term of at least five years. 
The JFBA pushed for three years, but the Supreme Court felt that would be insufficient, since it would 
normally take at least two years to adjust. See Ōkawa Shinrō （大川真郎）, Saibankan no Kyūgen no Tayōka・
Tagenka (裁判官の給源の多様化・多元化) [Diversification of Sources of Supply for Judges], 53 JIYŪ TO 
SEIGI, no. 2, at 30, 36 (2002). 
224  Id. Presumably reflecting the sense that matters in these fields were becoming increasingly complex, 
for the fields listed the Supreme Court seemed especially eager to recruit attorneys with specialized expertise 
and seemed willing to accept short-term appointments of less than five years. 
225 Torimatome, supra note 210. 
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involvement to ensure a neutral check.  At that time, members of the bar 
expressed the desire for representation by outsiders, including attorneys, on 
the screening body for attorneys seeking appointment. 226   From that 
perspective, the bar might have taken hope from another set of reforms 
recommended by JSRC, reforms aimed at “reflect[ing] the views of the public 
in appointment of judges.” 227   That set of recommendations led to the 
establishment in 2003 of the Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation 
Commission (“Judge Designation Commission”), which is charged with 
reviewing candidates for appointment to the judiciary, based on lists of 
candidates prepared by the Supreme Court General Secretariat.  The 
Commission, which lies under the aegis of the Supreme Court, contains eleven 
members: two judges, two lawyers, one prosecutor, and six other “persons of 
learning and experience.” 228  
 
 Even at the initial stage, one could point to a far longer list of 
challenges to the efforts to increase appointment of attorneys to the judiciary.  
On the part of the bar, no matter how firmly committed the leaders nor how 
vigorous the promotional efforts, success in expanding numbers of applicants 
ultimately depended on decisions by individual attorneys.  For its part, the 
judiciary, even if truly committed to the goal of recruiting more attorneys, was 
unlikely to appoint candidates it regards as unqualified or questionable.  Thus, 
success in expanding the number of attorneys joining the judiciary depended 
on ensuring a sufficient number of highly qualified candidates applied. 
 
In that respect, despite the pledges of commitment by the leadership on 
both sides, nearly all the earlier challenges persisted, including attachment of 
attorneys to practice, doubts about whether a judicial career is truly appealing, 
unease over allowing others to handle clients and pending matters, and 
misgivings over the burdens and uncertainty of the appointment process.  
Indeed, one concern that had largely been redressed in the 1990s came back 
into play: the concern over the location of postings and the frequent transfers.  
As noted earlier, to promote bengoshi ninkan, in the 1990s the Supreme Court 
provided assurances that attorneys with over fifteen years of experience could, 
if they so wished, insist on being posted to courts in or near the area where they 
reside (to the evident displeasure of career judges, who regarded this as 
unjustified preferential treatment).229  This was discontinued under the 2001 
                         
226  See Ōkawa, supra note 223, at 21, 23–24.  
227  JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 2. 
228  These reforms are discussed more fully in Foote, Transparency, supra note 6.  
229  Materials: Bengoshi Ninkan, supra note 136. 
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agreement.  As the Supreme Court explained, given the much larger numbers 
of attorneys who would be joining the judiciary, many of whom would likely 
come from the Tokyo and Osaka areas, if the preference was continued, most 
career judges would effectively be shut out of positions in those locations.230 
 
2. Experiences Outside the Judiciary for Assistant Judges  
 
The other set of reforms, aimed at ensuring all assistant judges spent 
substantial periods of time in positions outside the judiciary, faced its own set 
of challenges.  As mentioned above, these included arranging sufficient 
appropriate placements and working out details on compensation and benefits.  
While not voiced publicly, it seems likely that another concern on the side of 
the judiciary was the fear that, once assistant judges had experienced life in a 
law firm, they might never come back.231  Yet another possible concern was 
that the assistant judges themselves might resent being seconded to other 
bodies.  If so, their dissatisfaction might lead to resistance or reduce the 
attractiveness of judicial careers. 
 
Yet at the time this set of reforms was instituted, there were several 
reasons for hope.  First, the judiciary already had undertaken efforts along 
similar lines, pursuant to Yaguchi’s initiative in the 1980s.  Despite Yaguchi’s 
initial fears, companies and other governmental ministries and agencies had 
proven willing to accept judges.232  Another reason for hope was that, apart 
from securing placements and working out details on compensation and 
benefits, this reform lay almost entirely under the purview of the judiciary’s 
strong centralized administrative organization.  Ever since the Meiji Era the 
Japanese judiciary has had a tradition of regular re-assignments and transfers 
of judges.  In the postwar era, transfers and other personnel matters have been 
handled by the Personnel Bureau within the Supreme Court General 
Secretariat. While in principle judges may object, in practice they routinely 
                         
230  See Ōkawa, supra note 223, at 37.  
231  Relatively soon after the new system had gone into effect, I raised this possibility with a judge who 
had been involved in the implementation efforts. He conceded there had been such a concern and said the 
judiciary had been relieved when the two-year term of the first cohort sent to law firms ended and all of the 
assistant judges returned. When I raised the same question recently with someone else, he said he was sure the 
judiciary would never send an assistant judge to a law firm in the first place if there was any thought he or she 
was the type who might be tempted to stay. Yet another informant, a partner at a prestigious law firm that has 
received several assistant judges, suggested the need to monitor career choices for a few years after the 
secondments ended. He had the clear sense some of the assistant judges enjoyed the law firm practice and he 
raised the possibility that, while all the assistant judges likely would return to the judiciary immediately after 
their secondments ended, some might elect to move to law firms within a few years thereafter.  
232  See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text. 
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accept the determinations of the Personnel Bureau.233  Thus, even if assistant 
judges resented being seconded to positions outside the judiciary, they almost 
certainly would abide by the decision.  
 
One might think that assistant judges, rather than resenting the 
secondments as an unwanted imposition, instead might welcome the 
opportunity to experience a different environment.  An additional reason for 
guarded optimism lay in the JSRC’s admonition to the judiciary to establish 
“effective measures” to “systematically ensure” assistant judges gather 
diversified experience outside the judiciary.  They suggested that this 
experience be taken into account in personnel evaluations to determine 
suitability for appointment as judges at the end of their ten-year terms as 
assistant judges.234  The success, of course, depended on whether the judiciary 
actually followed through in doing so.  For this set of reforms, assuming the 
judiciary was truly committed, it seemed likely realization would be 
considerably easier than for appointment of attorneys: a two-year stint in 
another position for an assistant judge early in her career, with a guaranteed 
return to the judiciary at the end of that term, is far less momentous than the 
decision to give up an established career as a lawyer to enter a long-term 
commitment to the judiciary.  And the Japanese judiciary, with its strong 
centralized administrative structure, would be well positioned to 
institutionalize the reforms.  
 
E. Routinization: Results of the Reforms 
 
Now, nearly sixteen years after the Supreme Court/JFBA pledge for 
cooperation, the new system is well into its routinization phase.  The following 
section will examine results for three separate aspects of the reforms: the 
“part-time judge” system, appointment of attorneys to the judiciary (bengoshi 
ninkan), and the system for ensuring assistant judges attain diversified 
experience outside the judiciary. 
 
1.  Part-Time Judges 
 
The judiciary followed through on its pledge to establish a “part-time 
judge” system.  In 2003, the Diet enacted amendments to the Civil 
Conciliation Act 235  and the Domestic Relations Trial Act, 236  authorizing 
                         
233  See, e.g., RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 207, at 10. 
234  See JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(1)a.  
235  Minji Chōtei Hō (民事調停法) [Civil Conciliation Act], Act No. 222 of 1951, art. 23-2 (amended by 
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attorneys to conduct conciliation proceedings (court-annexed conciliation).  
The judiciary commenced the system in January 2004. 237   Through this 
system, attorneys, while retaining their law practice, serve one day per week 
presiding over conciliation matters at district, summary, or family courts, 
along with two lay members.  The attorneys thereby occupy the same role 
normally performed by full-time judges.  The appointments are for two-year 
terms, and may be renewed once.  In addition to district courts in Tokyo and 
Osaka, posts are available in sixteen summary courts and twelve family 
courts.238  The key rationales for establishing the system were to strengthen 
conciliation and to promote the appointment of attorneys to the judiciary.239  
Through this experience, attorneys would be able to experience judicial life, 
and it was hoped that a substantial number of part-time judges would elect to 
pursue appointment thereafter as full-time judges. 
 
As a whole, this system has been a success.  The judiciary sought thirty 
appointees for the first cycle in 2004, and it was fully subscribed, with 
twenty-eight more appointed later that year, and all available positions have 
been filled since.240  The judiciary initially envisioned that the number of 
part-time judges would rise to about 100 within a few years.241  Currently, 
approximately 120 part-time judges are serving and, as of October 2016, a 
total of 484 attorneys had served as part-time judges.242 
                                                                          
Act No. 128 of 2003). 
236  Kaji Shinpan Hō (家事審判法) [Domestic Relations Trial Act], Act No. 152 of 1947 (amended by 
Family Case Proceeding Act, Act No. 52 of 2011, art. 250) (which came into effect in 2013).  
237  See, e.g., Kitano Kōichi (北野幸一), Hijōkin Saibankan Seido no Genjō to Kadai (非常勤裁判官制
度の現状と課題) [Current Circumstances and Challenges for the Part-Time Judge System], 56 JIYŪ TO 
SEIGI, no. 4, at 11, 12 (2005). 
238  See Booklet, Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai (日本弁護士連合会) [JFBA], Bengoshi Ninkan Q&A – 
Hijōkin – (弁護士任官Q&A—非常勤—) [Q&A re Appointment of Attorneys to the Judiciary – Part-Time –] 
(Sept. 2017), https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/publication/booklet/data/ninkan_qa_parttime.pdf 
[hereinafter Q&A]. 
239 See Memorandum, Saikō Saibansho, Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai (最高裁判所、日本弁護士連合会) 
[Supreme Court, JFBA], Iwayuru Hijōkin Saibankan Seido no Sōsetsu ni tsuite (Bengoshi Ninkan tō ni 
kansuru Kyōgikai no Kyōgi no Torimatome（いわゆる非常勤裁判官制度の創設について（弁護士任官
等に関する協議会の協議の取りまとめ）） [Regarding the Establishment of the So-Called Part-Time Judge 
System (Arrangement of Deliberations of the Deliberation Council on Appointment of Attorneys to the 
Judiciary, etc.)] (2002), https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/judical_reform/data/sousetsu.pdf. 
240  For these and other figures in this paragraph, see White Paper, supra note 154, at 143. As a personal 
reflection, on a number of occasions during the twelve years I served on the screening committee for the No. 2 
Tokyo Bar Association, there were more qualified applicants than positions available.  
241 See Myōga Hideki（明賀英樹), Hōsō Seido Kentōkai (Saibankan sono ta) (法曹制度検討会（裁
判官その他)) [Expert Consultation Committee on the Legal System (Judges and Other Matters)], 54 JIYŪ TO 
SEIGI, no. 8, at 18, 20 (2003). 
242 White Paper, supra note 154, at 143. 




How successful the system has been in serving as a stepping stone to 
full-time judicial positions, however, is a matter of interpretation.  Over a 
quarter of the attorneys appointed as full-time judges between 2005 and 2014 
had first served as part-time judges.  Yet that percentage is more a reflection of 
how few attorneys have been appointed as full-time judges, rather than how 
many part-time judges have gone on to full-time positions.  During the first ten 
years of the part-time judge system, only thirteen of the 350 that served went 




2.  Full-Time Judges 
 
As the preceding paragraph suggests, the efforts to invigorate the 
appointment of attorneys to full-time positions in the judiciary have 
languished.  Despite JFBA’s confident prediction that twenty attorneys would 
join the judiciary in 2003, the first year after the renewed commitment took 
effect only ten were appointed.244  Further, the projections that the numbers 
would rise steadily from there, reaching 100 by 2011 and continuing at that 
level each year thereafter, look ludicrous in retrospect.  In 2004 only eight 
attorneys joined nationwide, and that is higher than any year since.245  In 2010, 
and again in 2015, only one attorney was appointed to the full-time judiciary; 
cumulatively only sixty-seven attorneys joined the judiciary from 2003 
through 2016, an average of fewer than five per year. 246   During that 
fourteen-year period over 1400 assistant judges were appointed directly after 
completion of their LTRI training.247  The career judiciary remains firmly 
intact. 
 
3. Diversified Experience for Assistant Judges 
 
What of the JSRC’s call for “in principle, all assistant judges” to “leave 
their status as judges . . . for a reasonably long period suited to obtaining 
meaningful experience” and “gather diversified experience as legal 
                         
243  See Q&A, supra note 238, at 4 (25% figure calculated on the basis of 45 attorneys appointed as 
judges between 2005 and 2014).  
244  For these and other figures in this paragraph, see White Paper, supra note 154, at 142. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247  Figures calculated by the author. See Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/iinkai/kakyusaibansyo/. 
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professionals in positions other than the judiciary . . . , such as lawyer or public 
prosecutor”?  Has that reform been achieved? 
 
According to a summary set forth on the Home Page of the Cabinet 
Secretariat, by 2002 slightly over fifty assistant judges each year commenced 
experiences of one to two years outside the judiciary.  This included about 
twenty-five who were seconded to government ministries or agencies, about 
twenty undertaking study abroad, about five undertaking training programs in 
businesses, and two or three headed to diplomatic offices abroad.248  At the 
time, assistant judges were not allowed to work in law firms.  As mentioned 
earlier, however, in 2004 the Diet passed the necessary legislation authorizing 
assistant judges (and prosecutors) to work in law firms.249  Just five days later, 
the Supreme Court Judicial Conference, comprised of all fifteen justices on the 
Court, issued the following resolution: 
 
The Supreme Court recognizes that, in order to secure 
broad-minded judges endowed with diverse and rich knowledge 
and experience, it is exceedingly meaningful for assistant judges 
to attain diversified experience outside the judiciary . . . Based on 
that recognition, up until now we have sought to bolster the 
programs for seconding assistant judges to government bodies, 
dispatching them to private enterprises, sending them abroad for 
study, having them work in overseas diplomatic offices, etc.  
With the recent passage of the [above act], a system has been 
established for assistant judges to . . . experience work as 
attorneys.  Now that the necessary conditions have been 
met . . . we set forth the following fundamental policy with 
regard to diversifying the experiences of assistant judges: 
 
Upon ensuring arrangements to handle the caseload, securing 
sufficient appropriate settings to receive the assistant judges, and 
working out the circumstances and conditions, we pledge to 
provide opportunities, in principle to all assistant judges, to 
gather diverse experience in such ways as through work as 
attorneys, in government bodies, and in overseas diplomatic 
offices, through dispatching to private enterprise, and through 
                         
248  (Heisei 14 nendo) Gaibu ni Dete iru Hanjiho no Genjō ((平成１４年度) 外部に出ている判事補
の現状) [Current Circumstances of Assistant Judges Who Are Outside (The Judiciary)] (2002), 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai17/17siryou_sai2.pdf. 
249  Act Concerning Experience as Attorneys. 





As mentioned earlier, on the same day the Judicial Conference issued 
this resolution, the Supreme Court entered into its agreement with JFBA to 
cooperate in arranging appropriate placements.251  The first such placements 
began in April 2005.252  
 
If one were to focus only on the numbers of assistant judges who have 
spent substantial periods of time in law firms, one would likely conclude this 
reform also has languished.  Between 2005 and 2016, the number of assistant 
judges who entered law firms under this program has hovered at about exactly 
ten per year.253  With an average of some 100 new assistant judges per year 
during that same period, the number of postings to law firms seems far from 
the JSRC aspiration for “all assistant judges” to experience positions “such as 
lawyer or public prosecutor.”  
 
On further investigation, however, the judiciary deserves far greater 
credit in this regard.  During the deliberations of one of the Expert 
Consultation Committees established to help turn the JSRC recommendations 
into concrete form, the Supreme Court proposed that other types of 
experience, such as study abroad programs and work in companies, should be 
regarded in the same way as work as lawyers or public prosecutors; and the 
Committee accepted that approach.254  When viewed in that light, it appears 
the judiciary has come much closer to achieving diversified experiences for all 
assistant judges than the figures for law firm placements suggest. 
 
While the judiciary itself has not publicized detailed records of the 
placements, an attorney based in Osaka has compiled extensive data on a wide 
range of judicial personnel matters, 255  including the program to provide 
diversified experiences for assistant judges.256  Among the materials available 
                         
250  See Judicial Conference Resolution, Supreme Court of Japan, Hanjiho no Keiken Tayōka ni kansuru 
Kihon Hōshin (判事補の経験多様化に関する基本方針) [Fundamental Policy Regarding Diversification 
of Experiences for Assistant Judges] (June 23, 2004), 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai25/sonota1.pdf. 
251  Arrangement of Matters, supra note 187. 
252  See supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text. 
253  See White Paper, supra note 154, at 143. 
254  See Myōga, supra note 241, at 21. 
255  See BENGOSHI YAMANAKA MASASHI (ŌSAKA BENGOSHIKAI SHOZOKU) NO HP (弁護士山中理司 
(大阪弁護士会所属) の HP) [HOME PAGE OF ATTORNEY YAMANAKA MASASHI (MEMBER OF OSAKA BAR 
ASSOCIATION)], http://www.yamanaka-law.jp/cont11/main.html [hereinafter YAMANAKA HP]. 
256  See id.; Hanjiho no Gaibu Keiken (判事補の外部経験) [Outside Experience of Assistant Judges], 
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through his voluminous blog is a document prepared in 2014 by the Personnel 
Bureau of the Supreme Court General Secretariat, summarizing the 
placements outside the judiciary for assistant judges that were scheduled to 
commence in the following year.257  According to that summary, eighty or 
more assistant judges were scheduled to commence experiences of one to three 
years outside the judiciary.  The numbers included about twenty judges 
serving two to three year terms in the Ministry of Justice, of whom about ten 
were in administrative positions and about ten more were serving as shōmu 
kenji (prosecutors representing the government in civil and administrative 
litigation).258  In addition, about ten were headed to two-year terms at law 
firms, about ten to one-year terms at companies, about thirty to one- or 
two-year study abroad programs (typically as visiting scholars), and several 
each to other government ministries and agencies, overseas diplomatic offices, 
legal assistance projects, and other bodies.259  In testimony before the Legal 
Affairs Committee of the House of Councilors in May 2015, the head of the 
Supreme Court Personnel Bureau reported even higher numbers, with about 
fifteen assistant judges experiencing one-year terms at companies, ten in 
two-year terms at law firms, and about thirty-five each in two-year terms in 
                                                                          
http://www.yamanaka-law.jp/cont4/98.html [hereinafter Outside Experience]. 
257  Memorandum of the Personnel Bureau, Supreme Court General Secretariat, Hanjiho no Gaibu 
Keiken no Gaiyō (判事補の外部経験の概要) [Summary of Outside Experience by Assistant Judges] (April 
11, 2014), http://media.toriaez.jp/m0530/991339578643.pdf. 
258 An explanation is in order with regard to the roles played by the judges seconded to MOJ. In terms of 
formal title, judges seconded to MOJ (and, for that matter, most other government ministries and agencies) are 
designated as “prosecutors” (kenji, 検事). In the postwar era, although the judiciary and procuracy were 
separated (with the procuracy under the MOJ and judiciary under the independent Supreme Court), a pattern 
soon developed in which every year some judges were seconded to the procuracy and some prosecutors to the 
judiciary. That practice came to be known as hanken kōryū (判検交流, exchange of judges and prosecutors). 
See Kisa Shigeo (木佐茂男), Saibankan no Senmonsei to Dokuritsusei (Ichi) – Nishi Doitsu no Jitsumu to 
Hikaku Shite (裁判官の専門性と独立性(一) －西ドイツの実務と比較して－ )  [Expertise and 
Independence of Judges (1) – By Comparison to West German Practice – ], 40 HOKUDAI HŌGAKU RONSHŪ 
(北大法学論集) 301, 302–14 (1990). Initially, only a few moved in each direction each year, but by the 1980s 
the numbers on both sides had reached double digits. Id. at 307–10. While most of the judges seconded to the 
MOJ served in administrative roles or as shōmu kenji representing the government in civil and administrative 
litigation, some handled criminal prosecutions. For their part, most of the prosecutors seconded to the 
judiciary handled trials. Id. The bar had long been highly critical of this practice, and in 2012, the practices of 
seconding judges to MOJ to handle criminal matters and seconding prosecutors to the judiciary were 
abolished. See YAMANAKA HP, supra note 255. Criticism of allowing judges to serve as shōmu kenji has 
continued to mount; but, while an effort is underway to reduce the numbers, that pattern still exists. See 
Shukkō Saibankan no Meibo oyobi Hanken Kōryū (出向裁判官の名簿及び判検交流) [Name List of 
Seconded Judges and Exchanges of Judges and Prosecutors], Dai3no1 Hanken Kōryū ni kansuru Naikaku tō 
no Tōben（第３の１ 判検交流に関する内閣等の答弁） [No. 3-1 Testimony of the Cabinet, etc., regarding 
Exchanges of Judges and Prosecutors], available at http://www.yamanaka-law.jp/cont10/128.html (quoting 
explanation by Cabinet, submitted to the House of Representatives on Feb. 12, 2016). 
259 Outside Experience, supra note 256.  
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other government bodies and in one- or two-year study abroad programs, for a 
total of about ninety-five per year.  They added that the judiciary was 
continuing to seek to expand the number of placements available.260 
 
Turning our attention back to the 2014 summary of placements outside 
the judiciary, that document quite clearly was prepared and intended for 
internal use.  A member of the judiciary has assured me, however, that it is not 
highly confidential.  Rather, he reports, a document of the same type is 
prepared each year and distributed to all assistant judges.  As part of the 
personnel process, every judge and assistant judge is required to fill out and 
submit a “card” each year, containing a brief summary of such matters as 
health condition, family circumstances, and desires, if any, regarding location 
of placement for the coming year.  In the case of assistant judges, the card 
includes a section asking preferences regarding experience outside the 
judiciary, with eight types of experiences listed plus a catchall “other,” and 
with three choices for each: “desire,” “would not mind experiencing” (経験し
ても良い), and “do not desire.”261 The summary of placements scheduled to 
commence in the coming year is prepared and distributed to assistant judges 
annually, to provide them with information on the options available.  As this 
shows, the program for ensuring assistant judges attain experience outside the 
judiciary has become a firmly established element of the judiciary’s personnel 
policy. 
 
This personnel system represents an important aspect of the judiciary’s 
efforts to “systematically ensure” assistant judges gather diversified 
experience outside the judiciary, as demanded by the JSRC.  As mentioned 
earlier, the JSRC suggested outside experience should be taken into account in 
personnel evaluations to determine suitability for appointment as judges at the 
end of the ten-year terms of assistant judges.  The Supreme Court acted on that 
recommendation as well.  In deliberations at one of the Expert Consultation 
Committees formed to place the JSRC recommendations into more concrete 
form, the Supreme Court pledged to issue guidance on the value of this 
experience and to instruct the Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation 
Commission to regard this as an important factor in its consideration of the 
                         
260  Id. Labeled within as Dai3 Hanjiho no Gaibu Keiken ni kansuru Kokkai Tōben (第３ 判事補の外
部経験に関する国会答弁) [No. 3: Diet Testimony Regarding Outside Experience for Assistant Judges]. 
261  See Saibankan ni kansuru Jinji Jimu no Shiryō no Sakusei tō ni tsuite  (裁判官に関する人事事務
の資料の作成等について) [Regarding the Preparation, etc., of Personnel Affairs Materials for Judges] 
(March 1, 2012), http://media.toriaez.jp/m0567/833614436808.pdf. For the assistant judge card, see id. at 
Besshi Yōshiki Dai2-2 (別紙様式第２−２) [Attached Form No. 2-2]. 
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suitability of assistant judges for appointment as judges.262  References in 
minutes of the Judge Designation Commission reveal that at least someone on 
that Commission has been keeping tabs.  In 2012, that member reported 
running a calculation that showed over twenty-five percent of the tenth-year 
assistant judges up for appointment as judges that year had not attained outside 
experience.263  At the following meeting, a representative from the Personnel 
Bureau explained that a variety of personal factors had affected members of 
that cohort of assistant judges, and provided assurances that the percentages of 
those who had attained outside experience were much higher for the following 
year.264  Even allowing for the fact that some assistant judges experience both 
study abroad and a second outside experience, one can infer that, with eighty 
to ninety-five placements each year, the judiciary is coming close to ensuring 
all assistant judges have at least one such experience. 
 
F.  Evaluation 
 
1.  Bengoshi Ninkan: Appointment of Attorneys to the 
Judiciary 
 
In retrospect, one may wonder why the proponents of bengoshi ninkan 
felt the efforts this time around would be so much more successful than earlier 
efforts.  Here, let us briefly reconsider a number of the potential facilitating 
factors identified earlier. 
 
Level of Commitment: On the bar side, those deeply involved in 
promoting bengoshi ninkan, of whom there were many, likely felt the level of 
commitment was far greater than in the past.  Yet looking back at the extensive 
efforts spearheaded by Nakabō in the 1990s, the similarities are striking.  So 
too, I would submit, is the “rapid loss of moral fervor” in both eras— one of 
the many challenges Feeley identified.  On the bench side, while the judiciary 
developed appointment procedures and undertook other activities to help 
smooth the way for appointees, one does not get the sense that the judiciary as 
a whole shared Yaguchi’s view that hōsō ichigen was the “most desirable” 
                         
262  See Myōga Hideki, supra note 241 at 21. 
263  See Meeting Minutes, Supreme Court General Secretariat, Minutes of the 52nd Meeting of the Lower 
Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission (Feb. 20, 2012), at 4–5, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/806040.pdf. 
264  See Meeting Minutes, Supreme Court General Secretariat, Minutes of the 53rd Meeting of the Lower 
Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission (July 5, 2012), at 4, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/806041.pdf. 
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system.265  As of the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was a perception that 
top LTRI trainees increasingly were opting for the large law firms, and the 
judiciary presumably viewed bengoshi ninkan as a potential means for 
attracting top candidates back to the judicial ranks.  The major objective was to 
improve the existing career system, not replace it.  Given those circumstances, 
it should not come as a great surprise to find limited “incentive to innovate” on 
the part of the judiciary. 
 
Size of the Bar: The great rise in the size of the bar has increased the 
pool of potential candidates to enter the judiciary from legal practice.  Given 
widespread accounts of heightened competition among lawyers, one may 
assume that a fair number of attorneys—especially struggling ones—would 
welcome the opportunity to gain a stable position in the Japanese judiciary, 
where salary levels are respectable.266  Needless to say, the judiciary has no 
interest in hiring struggling lawyers, or even average lawyers.  On the other 
hand, the increase in the number of bar exam passers, together with the 
perception of strong competition among lawyers, has made it easier for the 
judiciary to recruit enough assistant judges from among high-ranking LTRI 
trainees. 
 
Rise in Large and Medium-Sized Law Firms: The number of large and 
medium-sized firms has increased greatly.  Even at those firms, however, 
arranging for others to take over one’s clients and pending matters is not easy.  
Outstanding mid-career attorneys, of the sort the judiciary would like to 
recruit, are likely to have heavy responsibilities.  For those attorneys, 
moreover, there would likely be a significant salary differential if they were to 
enter the judiciary.267  Just as in the 1990s, the anticipated rise in applicants 
from large firms has not materialized.268 
                         
265  A more conspiratorial view of Yaguchi’s goal in espousing bengoshi ninkan is that he realized that in 
order to attract significant numbers of attorneys, the pay level and prestige of the judiciary would have to be 
increased greatly. KOBAYASHI, supra note 107, at 217–18. Viewed in that light, others in the judiciary 
presumably would have agreed. 
266  According to an estimate as of December 2015, judges at the age of 40 receive annual compensation 
of somewhat over 10,000,000 yen (approx. $100,000 at current exchange rates), not including location 
bonuses. For high-ranking lower court judges, annual compensation, including location bonuses, rises to over 
20,000,000 yen. See BENGOSHI YAMANAKA MASASHI NO HP (弁護士山中理司の HP) [HOME PAGE OF 
ATTORNEY YAMANAKA MASASHI], Saibankan no Nenshū oyobi Taishoku Teate (Suitei Keisan) (裁判官の年
収及び退職手当(推定計算)) [Annual Compensation and Retirement Allowances for Judges (Estimate)], 
http://www.yamanaka-law.jp/cont8/56.html.  
267  See, e.g., Komaya Takao （駒谷孝雄）, Bengoshi Ninkan to Kyaria Saibankan to no Kyōzon (弁護
士任官とキャリア裁判官との共存) [Coexistence of Attorneys Appointed to Judiciary and Career Judges], 
52 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 3, at 90, 91 (2001) (judge, writing as of time of reforms, concluding that judicial salaries 
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Number of Judges: The number of judges rose gradually from 2001 
through 2014, before dropping again in 2016.  As of 2001, there were 2243 
judges (excluding summary court judges).  In 2016, the number stood at 
2755—an increase of just over 500.269  This is considerably less than the JSRC 
projections.  And, as the bar is quick to point out, the rate of increase for the 
judiciary is far lower than that for the bar, which doubled over the same period.  
That said, there has been only a relatively modest increase in the average time 
required for processing cases.270  In a related matter, JSRC’s calls for phased 
elimination of the tokurei hanjiho system have not been implemented.  This 
stands as a clear example in which the judiciary reverted to—or, more 
accurately, stuck to—old practices once the immediate pressure for change 
had passed. 
 
New Measures to Be Taken by the Bar: The bar did not follow through 
on its pledge to establish one or more law firms to serve as a transition point 
for attorneys entering the judiciary and then returning to practice after serving 
on the bench.271  In nearly all cases, attorneys entering the judiciary have had 
to make arrangements for clients, staff, and office-related matters by 
themselves.272  In this respect, the fragmentation of the bar served as a barrier 
to undertaking the coordination needed to establish such firms.273 
                                                                          
are stable and quite respectable, but income is likely to be lower than for outstanding attorneys). For estimates 
of lawyer income, see Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Industrial Organization 
of the Japanese Bar, 7 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 460 (2010). 
268  One might contrast that with the situation for fixed-term appointments of attorneys to government 
ministries and agencies, which were authorized by new legislation in 2000, also in line with suggestions by the 
JSRC. As discussed further below, see infra at note 291, those positions are proving popular among attorneys 
in large law firms. Among the noteworthy differences with judicial appointments, the terms are shorter, 
typically ranging from one to three years; the government posts typically are located in Tokyo, so, at least for 
attorneys at Tokyo firms, they entail no change in location; and, by enabling greater specialization with 
exposure to cutting-edge issues, the future career benefits are much more readily apparent.  
269  Figures from White Paper, supra note 154, at 48. The number of judges had reached 2944 in both 
2014 and 2015, before declining again in 2016.  
270  The average time for processing district court first-instance ordinary civil cases (excluding consumer 
loan cases, which have become highly routine) rose from 8.5 months in 2001 to 9.2 months in 2014. See 
Saibansho (裁判所) [Courts of Japan] July 10, 2015, Saiban no Jinsokuka ni kakawaru Kenshō ni kansuru 
Hōkokusho (Dai6kai) （裁判の迅速化に係る検証に関する報告書(第 6 回) [Report Regarding 
Investigation Concerning Efforts to Speed Up Trials (6th report)], at 4, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/about/siryo/hokoku_06/index.html. 
271  See Ōshima, supra note 212, at 11.  
272  See id. 
273  In later years, JFBA did help organize a network of law firms to serve as transition points for 
attorneys entering fixed-term positions in local government bodies. See Memorandum, Nihon Bengoshi 
Rengōkai (日本弁護士連合会) [JFBA], Jichitainai bengoshi tō nin’yō shien jimusho Q&A (自治体内弁護
士等任用支援事務所 Q&A) [Q&A Regarding the Office to Assist for Employment of In-House Lawyers at 
Local Government Bodies], http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/recruit/data/jichitainai_qa.pdf. The 
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New Measures to Be Taken by the Judiciary: For its part, the judiciary 
did not follow through on its pledge to establish new short-term judgeships or 
specialized judgeships.274  As a practical matter, one wonders how much 
difference this would have made.  It seems unlikely that specialists in 
high-demand fields would have leapt at the chance to give up practice and 
enter the judiciary.275  And, even without an express “short-term” judgeship, if 
attorneys truly wish to return to practice after just two or three years on the 
bench, there seems little way the judiciary could prevent them from doing so.  
As discussed earlier, the judiciary did establish the “part-time judge” system.  
Implications of that system are considered further below. 
 
Let us turn now to a brief look at some of the major challenges.  
 
Location of Postings/Transfers: As noted earlier, the bar’s confident 
assertion that many attorneys would seek appointment provided the judiciary 
with a convenient justification for ending the system allowing experienced 
attorneys to request to be posted within commuting distance of their 
residences.  Thus the judiciary, with the consent of the bar, reverted to prior 
practices.  While the bar may have been so sure of its cause that it did not view 
this as a major worry, it likely represented an important concern for many 
potential candidates.  For attorneys who have already established homes, the 
prospect of having to move, potentially every three years, represents a 
substantial barrier.276 
 
Attachment to Practice and Doubts about Judicial Careers: Perhaps the 
greatest challenge is simply that most successful attorneys enjoy their work 
and/or do not regard judicial careers as especially appealing.277  Much of the 
reason for this, I would submit, lies in the basic ethos of uniformity and 
anonymity in Japan’s nameless, faceless judiciary.  Japan’s judiciary is a large, 
                                                                          
reason for the difference is not readily apparent. It may simply be a product of a special sense of mission and 
fervor on the part of those involved in the efforts to promote in-house lawyers in local government bodies. 
274  See Ōshima, supra note 212, at 11. 
275  Instead, to meet the perceived need for judges with specialized expertise in fields such as bankruptcy 
and intellectual property, the judiciary appears to have sought to develop that expertise internally.  
276  As in the prewar system, art. 48 of the Courts Act provides that judges may not be moved to other 
positions or courts against their will. Yet evidently based on concerns that asserting this right might adversely 
affect future career prospects, judges routinely accept the transfers. See, e.g., Komaya, supra note 267, at 92. 
277  See, e.g., Meeting Minutes, Supreme Court General Secretariat, Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the 
Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission (Sept. 9, 2004), at 11, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/806007.pdf [hereinafter Minutes of the 10th Meeting] (in response 
to a suggestion that the judiciary try head-hunting to attract qualified attorneys, a member of the Commission 
secretariat (from the Supreme Court General Secretariat) replied that the high-achieving attorneys the 
judiciary would like to attract are the least likely to come). 
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centralized bureaucracy, in which judges are expected to conform to 
established norms.278  While it would be an overstatement to say that Japanese 
attorneys all enjoy high levels of autonomy, successful attorneys of the sort the 
judiciary would welcome are likely to have considerable independence.  This 
is a major reason JFBA has felt the need to conduct extensive PR campaigns to 
promote the virtues of judicial service.  
 
Burdens and Uncertainty of Appointment Process: One set of concerns 
raised by the bar in the 1990s was the lack of transparency regarding the 
standards by which candidates would be evaluated and the appointment 
process.  These were coupled with the concern that the appointment process 
lay entirely within the Supreme Court General Secretariat, with no check by 
neutral outsiders.  
 
In fact, while highly abstract, in the 1990s the judiciary had set forth a 
list of the criteria it regarded as important in evaluating attorneys seeking 
appointment.  Ironically, in 1998, shortly before the recent reforms, the 
Supreme Court announced it was abrogating that list on the ground that 
appropriate consideration involved a “comprehensive assessment of the entire 
person,” which no list of factors could capture properly.279  In accordance with 
another recommendation by the JSRC, though, in 2003 the Supreme Court did 
establish the Judge Designation Commission.  As mentioned earlier, that 
Commission is charged with reviewing candidates based on lists prepared by 
the Supreme Court General Secretariat.  It considers candidates for initial 
appointment as assistant judges, fresh after completion of LTRI training; for 
appointment of assistant judges to full judge status; for the successive 
reappointments of judges every ten years; and for appointment of attorneys to 
the judiciary. 
 
Under the current system, the process for appointment of attorneys to 
the judiciary begins with review by a screening committee in the respective 
local bar association.  If that screening committee deems a candidate suitable, 
                         
278  Along these lines, see, e.g., Ogawa Tatsuo (小川達雄), “Nijūseiki no Shukudai” Hōsō Ichigen Seido 
no Jitsugen e (「20世紀の宿題」法曹一元制度の実現へ) [“Homework from the 20th Century”: Realizing 
the Hōsō Ichigen System], 51 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 1, at 50, 60 (2000) (from reactions during “caravans” to 
promote hōsō ichigen, even though a fair number of attorneys feel work of judges is appealing, they are 
resistant to the closed nature of the career system under bureaucratic control).  
  It bears note that it is not as though attorneys lack any sense of what life as a judge would be like. 
Apprenticeship training at the LTRI includes stints, ranging from two to four months (depending on when the 
training took place), in both a civil division and criminal division of a court. 
279  See Ōkawa, supra note 134, at 34. 
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it recommends the candidate to the Supreme Court. Authorities at the Supreme 
Court then conduct a further examination and send the names of candidates on 
to the Judge Designation Commission to have it assess for suitability. 
 
As the bar had hoped, the Judge Designation Commission is composed 
primarily of outside members.  There are only two judges among the eleven 
members, and the Commissions also includes two attorneys.  Yet the results of 
the Commission’s evaluation of attorney candidates have led to consternation 
on the part of the bar.  Over the fourteen years that the review process has been 
in effect it has considered a total of 103 attorney candidates.280  Of those, the 
Commission has deemed forty-eight suitable for appointment, but forty-five 
unsuitable.  Thus, it has rejected well over forty percent of the attorney 
candidates, all of whom had passed the screening process by their local bar 
associations.  For purposes of comparison, over that same fourteen-year 
period, the Commission deemed more than ninety-six percent of the 
candidates fresh out of the LTRI suitable for initial appointment as assistant 
judges, and also deemed suitable more than ninety-eight of the candidates 
from within the career judiciary for appointment or reappointment as judges. 
 
Needless to say, these results have further weakened attorney interest in 
applying for the judiciary.  For candidates, the application process requires 
considerable time and energy, not to mention the burdens involved in 
explaining to clients, finding other lawyers to take over pending matters, and 
all the other steps for winding down one’s practice.  Naturally, it is a great 
disincentive to hear that, at the end of that long road, 40% of candidates are 
rejected and then have to go back through the process of reestablishing their 
practices—not to mention suffer the embarrassment of having clients and 
associates learn of the rejection. 
 
What, one might ask, are the reasons for these high rejection rates?  
Here, we might refer back to Feeley’s observations that reformers from 
outside the judiciary “rarely have a continuing concern with the problems . . . . 
Indeed, success to many outsiders means adoption  . . . [S]uccess of programs 
has often been declared prematurely.”  Has that been the situation in Japan?  
Most decidedly not.  The bar has continued to be actively involved in 
promoting the appointment of attorneys to the bench.  The bar recognizes that 
                         
280  The figures contained in this paragraph reflect calculations by the author, based on a review of the 
minutes of the Commission since its establishment in 2003. Based on the minutes, over the past fourteen 
years, seven more attorneys have withdrawn their applications. Further, there may well have been more 
withdrawals at an earlier stage before the application was treated as officially having been made. 
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the high rejection rates for attorney candidates have resulted in a vicious 
circle, in which fewer and fewer qualified candidates are willing to take the 
step of going through the application and review process only to meet with 
rejection in the end.  Accordingly, the bar has sought to ascertain the reasons 
for rejection and clarify the standards candidates are expected to meet.  Yet the 
bar has failed in those efforts.  The judiciary and the Judge Designation 
Commission have steadfastly held to the position that assessment is made on a 
comprehensive evaluation of the entire person, and will not reveal concrete 
reasons for deeming candidates unsuitable.  Indeed, when, a group of attorneys 
conducted its own investigation and compiled a list of factors that seemed to 
be reasons for determinations of unsuitability,281 the Commission reacted with 
outrage.  It condemned the article in question, saying the bar’s efforts to 
identify and categorize reasons for rejection would “give rise to suspicions 
regarding breaches of confidentiality and . . . lead to a loss of faith in the 
Commission.”282 
 
As for the reasons identified in that article, the list is as follows: 
 
1) Weak motivation/reasons for seeking to become judge: concrete, 
positive motivation/reasons not communicated; halfhearted choice, 
financial reasons; 
 
2) Lack of capacity: lack of balance, cooperativeness; overly 
aggressive speech; lack of appreciation for judicial duties; 
 
3) Bad grades at LTRI (applicable only to candidates at assistant judge 
level); 
 
4) Others: Insufficient information (too few cases handled, etc.)283 
 
Part-Time Judge System as Precondition for Appointment?  Despite the 
Commission’s expression of outrage at the effort to identify reasons for 
rejection, as early as its tenth meeting, in September 2004, the Commission 
itself highlighted the final item on the above list: the lack of sufficient 
                         
281  Kimura Kiyoshi (木村清志), Kakyūsaibansho Saibankan Shimei Shimon Iinkai Seido no Genjō to 
Kongo no Tenbō (下級裁判所裁判官指名諮問委員会制度の現状と今後の展望) [The Current Status of 
the Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission System and Prospects for the Future], 60 JIYŪ 
TO SEIGI, no. 10, at 22 (2009). 
282  For a more detailed examination, see Foote, Transparency, supra note 6.  
283  Kimura, supra note 281, at 24. 
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information about attorney candidates to evaluate them properly.  At that 
meeting, as one means for securing sufficient information, a representative of 
the Commission secretariat (from the Supreme Court General Secretariat) 
suggested service as a part-time judge for two or, with reappointment, four 
years.  This, the representative explained, would give the judiciary and the 
candidate alike ample opportunity to learn about each other, and would also 
provide time for a smooth transition from practice to the bench.284  Ever since, 
whenever the Commission has considered attorneys applying for the judiciary, 
it has highlighted insufficient information and noted its encouragement for 
serving as a part-time judge first.285 
 
The part-time judge system is important in its own right.  It has helped 
strengthen the conciliation system and, for attorneys with the desire to fulfill a 
sense of public service, it has provided the opportunity to serve in meaningful 
roles within the judiciary.  In terms of its significance with respect to 
diversification of the judiciary, however, the part-time system, which 
ostensibly started as a device for promoting appointment of attorneys, rather 
rapidly transformed into a device for the judiciary to screen potential 
candidates to assure their “suitability” for appointment.  Viewed cynically, one 
might suggest that what began as a tool to promote diversity soon became a 
tool to ensure, if not uniformity as such, at least that the candidates will fit into 
the career judiciary.  Thus, one might view this as a classic example of 
“co-optation and adaptation,” in which “[c]oncern for original goals [has] 
give[n] way to concern for organizational maintenance.”  
 
2.  Diversified Experience for Assistant Judges 
 
Turning to the reforms aimed at ensuring assistant judges attain 
experience outside the judiciary, given the JSRC’s call for “diversified 
experience as legal professionals in positions other than the judiciary, . . .  such 
as lawyer or public prosecutor” (emphasis added), the subsequent acceptance 
of the Supreme Court proposal to classify work in companies and overseas 
study as “diversified experience” watered down the recommendation.  Some 
members of the bar are undoubtedly concerned that only ten of the eighty or 
more assistant judges who undertake experience outside the judiciary each 
                         
284  See Minutes of the 10th Meeting, supra note 277, at 8. 
285  See, e.g., Meeting Minutes, Supreme Court General Secretariat, Minutes of the 32nd Meeting of the 
Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission (Feb. 8, 2008), at 2, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/806024.pdf; Meeting Minutes, Supreme Court General Secretariat, 
Minutes of the 52nd Meeting of the Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission (Feb. 20, 
2012), at 3, http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/806040.pdf. 
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year work in law firms.  This perceived imbalance is compounded by the fact 
that at least twice as many assistant judges serve in the Ministry of Justice as at 
law firms.  
 
Yet, on the whole, the system for diversified experience appears to be 
functioning well.  Rather than a drawback, the fact that assistant judges are 
experiencing a wide variety of placements, including companies and other 
government ministries and agencies, might be seen as a strength.  Those who 
return to the judiciary following outside stints share their experiences with 
colleagues.  Upon their return, I have been told, assistant judges make 
presentations about their experiences in a specially arranged meeting with the 
other judges at the court to which they are assigned.  When two or more 
assistant judges assigned to the same court return at the same time, they give 
their presentations together.  This provides an opportunity to compare and 
contrast their experiences.  Presumably, many judges share their experiences 
with colleagues both before and long after these formal presentations, as 
well.286  It bears note, moreover, that the rather low number of placements in 
law firms is primarily a reflection not of the wishes of the judiciary, but the low 
number of law firms willing to hire judges—and to pay their salaries, which is 
a condition of the system—for a fixed two-year term.  The Supreme Court 
would like to send more assistant judges to law firms, but sufficient 
placements are not available.287 
 
As this reflects, one of the ongoing challenges for this system is 
arranging appropriate placements.  Despite the difficulties in expanding law 
firm placements, though, it is clear that the judiciary has succeeded in securing 
a wide range of placements in many different bodies.  Apart from the study 
abroad opportunities (thirty-seven assistant judges as of 2016)288, the single 
largest receiving entity is MOJ, with approximately ten assistant judges posted 
to administrative positions, and ten more as shōmu kenji each year.  The prior 
practice of seconding judges and assistant judges to handle criminal matters 
was terminated in 2012 after longstanding criticism, and pressure is increasing 
for termination of the shōmu kenji secondments, as well.289  Some members of 
the Diet have also raised questions about the propriety of, and potential 
                         
286  See, e.g., Hamada Hiromichi, supra note 188, at 13–14. 
287  Id. at 16. 
288  See Gyōseikan Chōki Zaigai Kenkyūin no Meibo oyobi Hanjiho Kaigai Ryūgaku Kenkyūin no Meibo 
(行政官長期在外研究員の名簿及び判事補海外留学研究員の名簿) [List of Administrative Official 
Long-Term Foreign Researchers and List of Assistant Judge Study Abroad Researchers] (2017), 
http://media.toriaez.jp/m0574/709304320048.pdf.  
289  See supra note 258; YAMANAKA HP, supra note 255. 
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conflicts of interest involved in, seconding or dispatching assistant judges to 
other governmental bodies and private enterprises.290  In any event, despite 
these isolated doubts, the Supreme Court remains firmly committed to 
ensuring assistant judges attain meaningful experience outside the judiciary. 
 
As another possible challenge, what do the assistant judges (and 
potential new entrants to the judiciary) think?  Do they welcome the system or 
resent it?  
 
At large Japanese law firms, the opportunity to go abroad for study, at 
law firm expense, has long been regarded as a desirable perk for top-notch 
associates.  In recent years, moreover, associates at such firms increasingly 
have begun to spend periods of one to two years seconded to government 
ministries and agencies in their areas of specialization.  I have collected 
information and conducted interviews with several attorneys who have 
undertaken such positions (through a fixed-term appointment system, which 
arose from another set of recommendations by the JSRC); I have found these 
positions are quite popular among elite young attorneys.291  I have been told 
that this option has increased the attractiveness of law practice as a career 
choice for outstanding students trying to decide whether to pursue the 
bureaucracy or law. 292   From this research, my supposition was that the 
availability of similar opportunities, through the system for outside 
experience, might serve as a valuable tool for recruiting and retaining talented 
assistant judges.  
 
Based on an in-depth interview with a member of the judiciary who is 
highly knowledgeable about the system for outside experience (and to whom I 
have pledged anonymity), I have come to wonder whether that is the case.  For 
most assistant judges, as with elite young attorneys, the opportunity to 
undertake study abroad is highly regarded, as is the chance to serve in overseas 
diplomatic offices (although the latter opportunity is limited to just two or 
                         
290  See, e.g., Outside Experience, supra note 256; Dai3 Hanjiho no Gaibu Keiken ni kansuru Kokkai 
Tōben (第３ 判事補の外部経験に関する国会答弁) [No. 3  Diet Explanation Regarding Outside 
Experience for Assistant Judges] (May 14, 2015), http://www.yamanaka-law.jp/cont4/98.html (explanation 
by head of Supreme Court Personnel Bureau Hotta Maya before Legal Affairs Committee, House of 
Councilors).  
291 According to my calculations based on the lawyer profiles contained on the home pages of the law 
firms, as of July 2017 over twenty percent of the junior partners and nearly twenty percent of the senior 
associates at the so-called Big Five elite law firms in Tokyo had served or were currently serving in fixed-term 
appointments in government bodies.   
292  My article, The Advent of Government Lawyers in Japan, based on that research is scheduled for 
publication in 5 ASIAN J. OF L. & SOC. (forthcoming 2018).  
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three per year).  As for the other placements, however, views differ widely 
among assistant judges.  A considerable number of assistant judges, my source 
reports, are studious types who greatly value the autonomy and ability to work 
on one’s own afforded by the judiciary.  Assistant judges of that type are 
sometimes resistant to work as part of a team or to be subject to routine 
oversight by a supervisor, as is often the case with outside placements.  
Provided this report is accurate, to my mind it constitutes yet additional 
evidence of why diversified outside experience is valuable for the judiciary.  In 
any event, while the opportunity for outside experience may have less 
significance for attracting and retaining strong assistant judges than I had 
previously supposed, it seems highly unlikely to deter candidates from 
entering the judiciary.  For studious types who might not enjoy the outside 
placements, the alternatives of careers as either prosecutors (who, in the 
Japanese context, are constantly subject to careful oversight by supervisors) or 
attorneys would not seem to be very attractive options; and a two-year 
secondment, out of a judicial career of over thirty years, presumably would 
seem like a small price to pay. 
 
In sum, the system for assistant judges to attain diversified experience 
outside the judiciary has taken firm root.  The challenges it faces are modest, 
and it seems likely to remain a standard feature of the Japanese judiciary for 




Fifteen years after the advent of the most recent set of reforms, the 
part-time judge system and the system for assistant judges to attain experience 
outside the judiciary both have taken firm root.  Yet what the bar viewed as the 
centerpiece reform, the push for experienced attorneys to join the judiciary, 
has languished.  Thus, as an initial question, one might ask: So what?  What, 
after all, makes that reform so significant? 
 
Over fifty years ago, attorney (and later Supreme Court justice) Ōno 
Masao raised that question.  In reflecting on the deliberations and final report 
of the Investigation Committee, he observed that the attorneys on the 
Committee had not been able to persuade the other members that hōsō ichigen 
would be preferable to the career system.  The argument, he noted, had 
proceeded down parallel tracks, with the attorneys saying “the current system 
is a bureaucratic system” and others saying, in effect, “what’s wrong with 
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that?”293  Ōno himself offered a series of strong, concrete critiques of the 
shortcomings of the career system.294  Yet for the most part, the debate has 
proceeded down parallel tracks ever since.  At least as far back as the 
deliberations of the Investigation Committee, the concern has been raised that 
the appointment of large numbers of attorneys, with their “overly 
individualistic attitudes,”295  might undermine the legal stability and high 
predictability of the Japanese legal system, which many observers regard as 
one of its great strengths.296  On the other side, observers have raised exactly 
the same point to highlight the need for diversifying the judiciary, asserting 
that the over-emphasis on legal stability and certainty has led the judiciary to 
ignore or downplay other important matters.297  Proponents on the bar side 
remain sure of the shortcomings of the career system, and many continue to 
believe in the virtues of a system in which all judges would be selected from 
among experienced lawyers.  Outside the bar, however, many find the bar’s 
assertion that all judges should come from the attorney ranks self-serving, 298 
and most remain unconvinced of the need for a wholesale change in the career 
system.  
 
For its part, the JSRC adopted a middle-ground approach.  Not only did 
it accept the career system as an unavoidable reality, it effectively endorsed the 
career system, recognizing that “assistant judges have become the primary 
source of supply for judges” and that that situation would almost certainly 
continue in the future.  Yet the Reform Council took seriously the goal of 
diversifying the judiciary.  Despite its expressions of support for appointment 
of attorneys to the bench, in view of the past history and the absence of any 
new effective measures, the Council did not voice great hope for substantial 
increases in such appointments.  Given the realities, the Council adopted an 
alternative approach: it placed primary weight on its call for assistant judges to 
                         
293  Ōno Masao, supra note 90, at 6, 7.  
294  See id. at 7–9. 
295  See Investigation Committee Report, supra note 81, at 36. 
296  In the Japanese law field, the theme of predictability is most closely associated with J. Mark 
Ramseyer. See, e.g., RAMSEYER, supra note 207. Many others, John O. Haley and myself included, also have 
highlighted the theme of predictability.   
297  See, e.g., Abe Masaki (阿部昌樹), “Antei Shita Hō” kara “Seichō Suru Hō” e: Hōsō Ichigen no 
Hōchitsujo (「安定した法」から「成長する法」へ：法曹一元の法秩序) [From “Stable Law” to “Law that 
Grows”: Legal Order in Hōsō Ichigen], 51 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 1, at 64 (2000). This theme also has deep roots. 
In his 1963 critique of the Investigation Committee, Ōno highlighted the role of the career system in 
“maintaining order” through its adherence to a “formalistic rationalistic” (in other words, highly predictable) 
approach, while expressing concern that this approach gives insufficient attention to a wide range of relevant 
factors. See Ōno Masao, supra note 90, at 8. 
298 See KOBAYASHI, supra note 107, at 177–79, and sources quoted and cited therein. 
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attain experience outside the judiciary, putting that proposal first in its list of 
recommendations.  As we have seen, that alternative approach has taken firm 
root and is well on its way to becoming a fixed feature of the Japanese 
judiciary. 
 
This leads us to a final question: What accounts for the difference in the 
success of the two sets of reforms?  Returning to the Feeley framework, there 
was not a lack of historical perspective: the JSRC was aware of the history of 
prior reform efforts and took that history into account in crafting its reform 
proposals.  With regard to efforts to invigorate the system for appointing 
attorneys to the bench, one could point to various facets of resistance and 
co-optation.  One could also point to the lack of sufficient anticipation of the 
burdens involved in the application process and the high rate of rejections for 
attorney applicants.  Yet, above all, the fact that reform has languished reflects 
overconfidence on the part of the reform proponents.  To paraphrase Feeley, 
“They knew their ideas were good”; and they were so confident many 
attorneys either would want to join the judiciary or would feel a sense of 
obligation to do so to improve the justice system, they could not conceive of 
the fact that the flow of applicants would start off weak and then decline to a 
mere trickle.  
 
In contrast, the success of the system for assistant judges to attain 
experience outside the judiciary lies in the distinct difference between the 
United States judicial system on which Feeley’s analysis was premised and the 
Japanese judicial system.  As we have seen, Japan’s is not a fragmented 
system.  Nor is it a system in which a “single agency” within the judiciary 
might undertake a reform unilaterally, especially one that might have 
system-wide impact.  To the contrary, Japan has a highly centralized, 
bureaucratic judiciary, in which the Supreme Court General Secretariat plays 
the key coordination role.  The approach Feeley labels as “administrative” is 
by no means unusual for the Japanese judiciary.  Quite the opposite, it is 
standard operating procedure.  Given these fundamental structural attributes, 
and provided the requisite will exists, the Japanese judiciary is well suited to 
undertake measures, such as the system for outside experience by assistant 
judges, that can be planned and implemented internally, with only limited need 
for coordination with receiving institutions and other outside bodies.  
 
In closing, let me return to a final Feeley proposition: “Perhaps the 
greatest danger in the administrative strategy is that it will work, that it will 
transform a contentious and embattled group of professionals into cooperative 
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bureaucrats . . . .”299  In the case of the Japanese judiciary, contentious debates 
undoubtedly take place within the confines of the Supreme Court General 
Secretariat, but the overall framework constitutes a largely cooperative 
bureaucracy.  Whether that constitutes a drawback or a virtue rests in the eye 


































                         
299 FEELEY, supra note 7, at 205. 
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